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Abstract
With the D17 announcement, US-Cuba policies were suddenly and dramatically transformed after decades of
stale and repetitive relations. Guest editor Jorge Duany, director of FIU’s famed Cuban Research Institute,
invited a group of leading experts to examine the repercussions of the restoration of diplomatic ties and
discuss the intractable obstacles to the full restoration of relations between the two countries. Although
normalization of diplomatic relations and the prospect of change have produced an exciting time for
scholarship and policy analysis, the conclusion fifteen months later is that rapproachement has been slower
and more modest than expected.
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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
Dear Hemisphere readers:
As my colleague Jorge Duany indicates in the Letter from the Guest Editor in this issue of Hemisphere, prior 
to December 17, 2014 (D17) discussion about Cuba and US-Cuba relations seemed, for the most part, stale 
and repetitive. Not much new was worthy of reporting or analytical discussion. Cuba was not moving as quickly 
as many hoped toward economic and social reform, and in the political realm, Raúl Castro’s Cuba was frozen 
in time. US-Cuba relations suffered from similar paralysis, despite President Obama’s policy changes in the area 
of purposeful travel and some people-to-people programs. The incarceration of Alan Gross, the US government 
contractor sentenced in 2011 to 15 years in prison for bringing satellite and communications equipment to 
members of Cuba’s Jewish community, and the continued imprisonment in the US of three of the Cuban 
intelligence agents known as the “Cuban Five,” posed formidable obstacles to any kind of rapprochement.  
With the D17 announcement, US-Cuba relations were suddenly and dramatically transformed, shifting faster 
than our ability to make sense of the overall impact on Cuba’s political economy. Normalization of diplomatic 
relations and the prospect of change have produced an exciting time for scholarship and policy analysis. Florida 
International University (FIU) is at the forefront of analyzing and engaging the process and impacts of this historic 
development, across multiple disciplines. 
As the flagship publication of the Kimberly Green Latin America and Caribbean Center (LACC), Hemisphere 
dedicates this special issue to tracking and analyzing the impact of diplomatic normalization on US-Cuba economic 
relations, the Cuban-American community, Cuban nationalism and other important areas. I am grateful to Jorge 
Duany, director of FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI), one of the preeminent centers for the study of Cuba and 
Cuban Americans in the United States, for putting together a superb lineup of scholars to examine the complex 
aftermath of D17.  
President Obama’s historic visit to Cuba in March 2016 was not the culmination, but an important milestone in 
what is to be a long but irreversible process that began on D17. It marked just one more step toward engaging and 
empowering the Cuban people, helping change current dynamics and creating space for Cubans, as the president 
stated during his extraordinary speech in Havana, to determine their own future. During the coming months and 
years, LACC and CRI will continue to engage not only the scholarly and policy communities through their various 
research and outreach activities, but also, through the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, 
will partner with other FIU components to participate in the University’s goal of increasing ties with its academic 
counterparts in Cuba. 
Frank O. Mora
Director & Professor
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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F R O M  T H E  G U E S T  E D I T O R
When I came to Florida International University in August 2012, relations between the United States and Cuba 
seemed frozen in time, still characterized by Cold War tensions. Since December 17, 2014 (D17), many pieces of the 
puzzling connections between the two countries have shifted, some drastically, others more imperceptibly. On that 
date, President Barack Obama announced major changes in US policy toward Cuba, including taking steps toward 
reestablishing diplomatic relations, reviewing Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and facilitating certain 
types of trade and travel by US citizens to the island. On May 29, 2015, President Obama removed Cuba from the 
US Department of State’s terrorism list; in July 2015, the United States and Cuba restored diplomatic relations and 
reopened embassies in their respective capitals, and in March 2016 President Obama’s trip to Cuba marked the first 
time in 88 years that a sitting US president visited the island. Journalists, pundits and academics rushed to analyze this 
diplomatic milestone, portending a new era in US-Cuba relations.
 Unfortunately, the practical outcomes of the US-Cuba rapprochement have been slow, modest and largely 
unilateral. The two highlights of 2015 were the announcements of the resumption of direct postal service and, 
eventually, commercial flights between Cuba and the United States. High-ranking representatives of both governments 
have met several times to discuss matters of common interest, from migration and human trafficking to confiscated 
properties and human rights. The US government has made extensive amendments to existing sanctions against 
Cuba, easing trade, communication, travel, remittances and other financial transactions with the island. The Cuban 
government, in turn, has insisted on four major conditions for “normalizing” relations with the United States: lifting 
the US embargo, returning the US naval base in Guantánamo, repealing the Cuban Adjustment Act, and discontinuing 
US broadcasting activities to Cuba (i.e., Radio and TV Martí). At the time of this writing (April 2016), serious 
impediments remain to the full normalization of relations.
This volume of Hemisphere examines the numerous repercussions of the restoration of diplomatic ties between the 
United States and Cuba. Among other questions, it assesses some of the intractable obstacles to relations between 
the two countries, the economic opportunities created by an eventual lifting of the US embargo, and the potential 
role of the diaspora in the future of the Cuban nation. I invited a group of leading experts on Cuban affairs from 
various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities to reflect upon the significance of D17 for the two former 
Cold War adversaries. Regrettably, I did not receive the contributions I requested from three scholars residing in Cuba 
in time for publication. Nevertheless, the volume samples a wide range of opinions on the economic, political and 
social consequences of the rapprochement between the US and Cuban governments. The result, I hope, is a balanced, 
kaleidoscopic and insightful treatment of many of the difficult issues raised by the new US policy toward Cuba. 
Jorge Duany 
Director & Professor 
Cuban Research Institute 
Florida International University
Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo
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After 55 years of hostility, the announcement by Presidents Obama and Castro initiating the normalization of 
relations on December 17, 2014 
(D17) opened an important and 
positive new stage between the 
two nations. The pronouncement 
generated great expectations on 
both sides for rapid and successful 
progress, but was not grounded 
on knowledge of extant and 
future obstacles. Many journalists, 
businessmen, relatives and friends 
asked me about the imminent 
economic boom in Cuba, the 
reconstruction of Havana, the  
huge profits that US companies  
will accrue (McDonald’s will pop 
up all over the island!), or how 
to arrange a beach vacation in 
Varadero. People thought that 
Cuba was now fully unlocked for 
Americans and virtually all assumed 
that the Helms-Burton Act (referred 
to in Cuba as the “blockade”) was 
gone. Many well-intentioned friends 
wrongly assured me: “Now you 
won’t have any trouble attending 
academic events in Cuba.” Although 
many positive steps have been 
taken, mostly on the US side, the 
post-D17 dream will take a long 
time to realize. This article evaluates 
the potential short-, medium- and 
long-term economic impacts of the 
normalization process that began on 
D17. It begins by identifying and 
analyzing opportunities for both 
sides in key economic areas, goes 
on to examine the constraints and 
challenges to a full normalization of 
relations, and ends by inquiring why 
economic results have been so slow 
to emerge.
 
I. MAJOR ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR  
THE US AND CUBA
Two well-known Cuban 
economists have praised the push 
toward normalization. According to 
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, the 
results will be more in the medium- 
and long-term than in the short-
term, but will improve the living 
standards of the Cuban people. 
Ricardo Torres stresses the historical 
ties between the two countries, 
the fact that the US is the major 
importer and technology leader in 
the world, Cuba’s need for foreign 
capital, and the importance of 
Cuban Americans’ knowledge and 
international contacts. The  
most promising economic areas  
are evaluated below. 
 
1. Tourism. 
Tourism currently accounts for 
52% of total foreign investment in 
Cuba. The effects of normalization 
could begin to be seen faster than 
in other sectors of the economy, but 
the full results will take more time. 
Cuba’s advantages are its proximity 
to the US and its lure as “forbidden 
fruit” following the 54-year ban on 
travel to the island, prompting an 
outpouring of interest in visiting 
the island and a “discovery” flow. 
Obama’s amendments to existing 
regulations eliminate some red 
tape and allow 12 categories of 
travel, including educational, 
cultural, sports, religious and 
humanistic activities, family visits, 
journalism, professional research/
meetings, and “support for the 
Cuban people.” Major airlines plan 
to fly to Cuba and travel agencies 
are authorized to operate without 
special license. A tour package for 
one week costs about $5,000 per 
person, with prices likely to fall as 
competition increases. Travelers are 
permitted to bring back $400 in 
goods ($100 in rum and tobacco) 
and can use US credit cards, with 
no per diem rate (it used to be 
$188). MasterCard, American 
Express, Netflix and Twitter plan 
to expand operations in Cuba, but 
banking and telecommunications 
are essential prerequisites.
In the first half of 2015, the 
number of US visitors to Cuba 
jumped 50% and a higher upturn  
is expected for the entire year.  
With a forecast of one to two 
million US tourists, gross revenue 
from the tourism sector should 
increase from $3 billion to $4–$5 
billion annually. Benefits will  
mainly accrue to the state but 
also to rentals of private homes/
rooms (which currently lodge 
21% of all US tourists), paladares 
(small, privately owned family 
restaurants), taxi drivers and 
tourist guides.  
 
US-Cuba Economic Relations:
Opportunities and Challenges
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago
F E A T U R E
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2. Trade in goods and services.
The new regulations permit trade 
relations (imports and exports) 
with Cuba but are restricted to the 
non-state sector: self-employed, 
microbusinesses, non-agricultural 
and service cooperatives, private  
and usufruct farmers, and the 
building and repair of dwellings.  
US exporters/importers must 
provide proof that their Cuban 
partners are in the non-state sector. 
The Cuban government demands 
state trade without restrictions.
About 50 Cuban exports are 
now authorized to enter the US, 
including clothing, footwear, art, 
cosmetics, textiles, jewels, leather, 
furniture, bedding, mattresses, 
clocks, musical instruments, movies, 
wood, stone, paper, plastic and 
rubber articles, ceramics, glassware, 
cement, hats, umbrellas, toys, 
machinery, electrical equipment, 
vessels, and medical and surgical 
equipment. Most of these goods are 
not produced by microenterprises 
and some not even by the state. 
Also permitted are non-state 
export services, e.g., hiring skilled 
Cuban workers to carry out legal 
activities, translations, bookkeeping, 
software programming and language 
instruction. One key question is 
whether these goods and services 
would be competitive in the US 
market. Approved US imports to 
Cuba’s non-state sector include 
computers, software, personal 
telecom equipment, animal fodder 
and medicine. The only imports 
permitted to the state sector are 
food, animals, fodder and medicine. 
A Freedom to Export to Cuba Act 
introduced in the US Senate would 
eliminate all trade restrictions,  
but the Republican leadership  
opposes it. 
In 2013, Cuba imported $14.7 
billion in goods, partly subsidized 
and with credit, including $2 billion 
in food to meet 70% of domestic 
needs. As of 2008, Cuba imported 
$710 million in US foodstuffs, 
making this country its main food 
supplier and fourth largest trading 
partner. US products are of good 
quality, price competitive, and closer 
than other providers (90 miles, or 
2% of the 4,000 miles that stretch 
between Havana and Buenos Aires 
or São Paulo). The US Agricultural 
Coalition for Cuba, the National  
Corn Growers, and the Illinois Soy 
Bean Association are all lobbying to 
fully restore trade relations.  
 
3. Remittances. 
Current regulations eliminate 
previous limits on non-family 
remittances (which could be 
invested in microbusiness). In 
2014, about $4 billion in family 
remittances entered Cuba, 
representing 7% of the island’s GDP 
and its second leading hard-currency 
source. This figure will probably 
increase in 2015, with the capacity 
to boost the non-state sector. A 
national survey conducted in Cuba 
in March 2015 reported that only 
11% of recipients of remittances 
invest them in microbusinesses, but 
70% said they would like to do so. 
 
4. Oil and energy. 
Cuba’s crude oil production 
peaked at 3.7 million metric tons 
in 2003, thereafter stagnated, 
and in 2012 was 18% below the 
zenith; natural gas output peaked 
in 2007 at 1.2 billion cubic meters 
and had declined 12% by 2013. 
Causes of the fall were maturity of 
existing deposits, stagnation of new 
deposits, and Cuba’s cancelation of 
exploration/production contracts 
with two Canadian companies. 
Spain, Malaysia-Russia, Venezuela 
and Russia began oil exploration 
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2012, but 
these efforts were unsuccessful. In 
2014, Cuba suspended exploration 
due to previous failures and the 
decline in oil prices, but Portfolios 
of Investment Opportunities in 
2014 and 2015 gave priority to 
high-seas exploration and Russia 
recently granted Cuba $1 billion to 
try for the third time.
In recent years, Venezuela has 
sent Cuba 105,000 barrels of oil 
per day, meeting 60% of domestic 
need. In 2007, the Cienfuegos oil 
refinery, built with Venezuelan help, 
produced 65,000 barrels a day. 
Under the arrangement, Venezuela 
exported crude oil to be refined 
in Cienfuegos and Cuba sold 
the surplus on the world market. 
It’s not easy to assess if crude 
exports have declined due to the 
severe deterioration of Venezuela’s 
economy, especially since any 
decline appears to be offset by the 
Netherlands Antilles; however, 
exports of oil derivatives from Cuba 
through third parties decreased 
by one-third in 2013–2014, and 
a petrochemical project with 
Venezuela was suspended.
US technology and experience 
would support oil exploration on 
the high seas, on shore and inland; 
increase extractive efficiency; and 
postpone the depletion of deposits, 
making Cuba more independent 
of Venezuelan oil and diversifying 
its investment and oil partners. But 
first, the embargo must be lifted. 
 
5. Nickel. 
Cuba has the world’s fifth largest 
nickel reserves. Production peaked 
at 76,500 tons in 2001 but fell 11% 
by 2013. Nickel is Cuba’s main 
export but a decline in production 
and world prices reduced its export 
value by 29% in 2010–2012. The 
island has four nickel plants, the 
first two US-built: Nicaro (built in 
1947 and since closed), and Moa 
(built in 1957 and modernized/
expanded by Sherritt). The Che 
Guevara plant, built by the Soviets 
with obsolete technology, has been 
shut down temporarily. The Soviets 
also started construction of a plant 
in Las Camariocas; after the Soviet 
collapse, China pledged to complete 
it but soon withdrew as well. 
Venezuela currently has the project, 
but the plant is not in operation. 
The US has the technology and 
capital to renew Che Guevara and 
Camariocas, but current regulations 
prevent exporting Cuban ore to the 
US or investing in such facilities.  
 
6. Agriculture. 
In the last 55 years, Cuban 
agriculture has had a dismal 
performance due to excessive 
centralization. Land is mostly 
in state hands or controlled 
by incompetent state-run and 
-subsidized coops; farmers face a 
lack of economic incentives; and  
a highly inefficient state monopoly 
has a stranglehold on purchasing 
and distribution. Raúl Castro’s 
structural reforms try to tackle such 
flaws, calling for distribution of idle 
state land in usufruct, increased 
autonomy for coops, supply of 
some inputs, and microcredit for 
private and usufruct farmers. So far, 
the reforms have failed to increase 
agricultural output: the annual 
growth rate averaged 1% in 2010–
2013, with production of most 
items falling below 2005 and  
even 1989 rates. 
Official preliminary figures for 
2014 boasted an increase of 13.3%  
in agricultural output but significantly 
underestimate 2013 production; 
more reliable comparisons showed 
a sharp decrease. The Minister of 
Agriculture acknowledged that, 
despite all efforts to improve output, 
results were below expectations,  
and agriculture’s contribution to 
GDP was only 4%. Because of  
the failure of agrarian reform,  
Cuba now imports more than  
$2 billion in food that could be 
grown domestically. 
Although Cuban economists 
recommend giving priority to 
investment in agriculture, only 
4% of foreign investment is in this 
field, and so far only one Brazilian 
company has invested in the sugar 
sector. Current regulations allow for 
US export of tools, seeds, fertilizer 
and other supplies, but only to 
private and usufruct farmers. 
 
7. Biotechnology and 
pharmaceutics. 
In 1986–1991, Cuba created and 
expanded the “Havana Scientific 
Pole” with significant investments 
in equipment, technology and 
expertise. The project encompasses 
seven centers that specialize in  
interferon and genetic crop 
improvements; immunological 
analysis; identification of congenital 
deformations and hypothyroidism; 
vaccines against meningococcal 
infections and encephalomyelitis; 
surgery/treatment of neurological 
disorders (cerebral palsy, Parkinson’s 
disease, multiple sclerosis, stroke); 
treatment of brain diseases; 
biopharmaceuticals for the treatment 
of cancer and other non-infectious 
diseases; and nuclear medicine.
In their early stages, the seven 
centers generated substantial hard 
currency from selling patents in the 
US and exporting vaccines to Latin 
America. In 1992, due to the crisis 
caused by the USSR’s disappearance, 
the Cuban government transferred 
most of the centers’ revenue to 
the state, returning only a fraction 
and thereby dramatically reducing 
their investment. By the first 
decade of this century, some of 
the centers were languishing due 
to a lack of resources, poor access 
to technology, and the brain drain 
of technicians. Around 2013, the 
centers were unified, leading to a 
modest recovery. In the 1980s, Cuba 
was a major medication producer, 
but its success depended on raw 
material imports from the socialist 
camp. These ceased after the bloc’s 
collapse, and currently the island 
suffers from a severe shortage of 
medicine. Exports of pharmaceutical 
products—excluding medicine but 
probably including biotechnology—
accounted for 5% of total exports  
in 2013. 
Under normalization, a mutually 
fruitful exchange could evolve 
between Cuban and US universities 
and biotechnology institutes. 
Cuban experience and knowledge 
in biotechnology, neuroscience, 
immunology, vaccines and other  
fields would be beneficial to US 
scientists and in turn, Cuban 
scientists could gain from advanced  
US technologies. Current regulations 
won’t help in these fields because 
Cuba’s centers are state monopolies 
and exports and imports are banned. 
 
8. Banking. 
Almost all banking in Cuba is under 
state ownership/management. 
State banks collect people’s savings 
and use them to give loans to state 
enterprises and state-controlled 
agricultural coops. Fifteen branches 
of international banks provide 
services to foreign customers (but 
not Cubans), and loans to foreign 
and mixed enterprises not eligible 
for government loans. The poor 
telecommunications infrastructure, 
low quality of network data and 
scarcity of ATMs are all factors 
that restrict the banking system. 
In 2008–2009, the credibility 
of state banks suffered when the 
government froze the bank accounts 
of foreign investors and suppliers. 
More recently, the government has 
authorized self-employed workers, 
members of new coops, private 
and usufruct farmers to open 
bank accounts. The Central Bank 
is granting microloans, although 
these are notoriously insufficient. 
Current banking infrastructure, 
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electronic equipment and personnel 
are inadequate to meet the growing 
demand for services. Cuba's inclusion 
on the US Department of State’s 
list of state sponsors of terrorism 
also has caused Cuba enormous 
difficulties in making transactions 
through foreign banks; the US 
imposed billion-dollar sanctions on 
banks that failed to report 
deposits and operations by the 
Cuban government, making such 
transactions a significant risk. Cuba’s 
removal from the list of terrorist 
countries in 2015 should alleviate 
the situation.  
 
9. Telecommunications.
Cuba has well-trained computer 
professionals and Havana’s University 
of Information Sciences enjoys good 
equipment and Internet connections. 
The lack of resources, however, 
prevents the acquisition of equipment  
and advanced software, as well as  
access to the Internet by the population 
and companies. Cuba’s computer-
use rate per 1,000 inhabitants is 
one of the lowest in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, at 5% (30% 
have access to the state-controlled 
intranet); the cost per minute is the  
highest in the region and prohibitive 
relative to the average national salary. 
A recent effort has been made to 
provide computers to schools and, 
in March 2015, an agency opened 
in Havana for public and officially 
approved access to the Internet and 
Wi-Fi, attracting a flow of eager 
youngsters. The undersea cable 
between Cuba and Venezuela, which  
could expand Internet access and 
speed, began functioning in 2013, 
but only for government use. Current 
US regulations aim to improve this 
situation by promoting the export of 
computers and telecommunication 
equipment but require that the 
Cuban government relax controls on 
communications and the Internet 
and permit foreign investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure.  
 
10. Infrastructure and housing.
Cuba has not repaired or expanded 
its aqueduct and sewerage 
infrastructure in more than half a 
century, except in Santiago. Leakages 
result in significant amounts of 
water lost as well as a high incidence 
of water-borne gastrointestinal 
disease; potable water plants have 
been cut dramatically and water 
for human consumption must 
be boiled. Due to an insufficient 
number of collection trucks, garbage 
accumulates in the streets, and 
no processing plants are available 
to turn waste into energy. Roads 
and bridges are in bad condition 
and transport is inadequate to 
accommodate passengers and cargo. 
Cuba needs to import construction 
machinery and new techniques 
to improve its infrastructure, but 
current regulations prevent this. 
In 1960, the government confiscated 
most private homes, halted all 
rentals, banned mortgages, stopped 
private home construction and 
impeded the buying or selling 
of dwellings. Public housing 
construction was grossly insufficient 
to meet population growth and 
many dwellings decayed due to 
lack of maintenance, hurricane 
damage and building restrictions. 
The authorities approved private 
housing construction in the 1980s, 
but a severe shortage of building 
materials resulted in a drastic fall 
in production. Home construction 
dropped from 111,373 units in 
2006 to 25,037 in 2014, and units 
per 1,000 inhabitants declined 
from 9.9 to 2.3. Officially, the 
housing deficit is 600,000 units  
but my estimate is one million.  
A 2011 law authorized home sales 
and purchases, releasing capital 
frozen for 55 years that can now  
be invested to start a microbusiness 
or change homes. Sales are only 
3.6% of the housing stock due to 
the population’s low purchasing 
power (a cheap dwelling costs 
$5,000, but the annual average 
state-sector salary is $240, 
meaning that it takes 21 whole 
annual wages to buy a home), an 
outdated property registry, lack of 
mortgage financing, and excessive 
bureaucracy (an application for a 
home construction permit demands 
procedures at four state agencies 
and takes an average of 132 days). 
New regulations seek to alleviate 
the problem by facilitating imports 
of construction materials. In the 
March 2015 survey cited above, 
41% of the respondents said the 
US product or service they most 
desired was housing.  
II. STEPS AND CHALLENGES 
TO FULL NORMALIZATION
Since D17, both countries have 
reopened their respective embassies 
and signed a maritime protection 
agreement. The US has taken a 
series of positive steps on its own to 
accelerate the normalization process 
and address economic issues that 
benefit Cuba. 
These include: a) Facilitating 
American travel to the island;  
b) Lifting the cap on remittances, 
especially those for humanitarian 
purposes; c) Allowing exports to 
and imports from Cuba’s non-state 
sector; d) Removing Cuba from the 
list of state sponsors of terrorism;  
e) Asking the US Congress to lift 
the embargo; and f ) Introducing  
a Freedom to Export to Cuba Act 
in the US Senate that would  
eliminate all trade restrictions  
(the Republican leadership has 
blocked it).
On the Cuban side, the measures  
have been mostly political and 
not always reciprocal: 53 political 
prisoners have been freed, and  
Raúl Castro has praised Obama  
as a “decent” man, in contrast to  
11 previous US presidents. Cuba 
continues to demand the return  
of the US Naval Base at Guantánamo 
(this is probably negotiable but 
is subordinated to a clause that 
Cuba can’t rent the base to Russia 
or China) and has cut imports of 
US food and medicine. Castro 
has also taken some antagonistic 
actions: He failed to acknowledge 
Obama’s positive overtures at the 
2015 meeting of the UN Human 
Rights Commission, which 
overwhelmingly voted against the 
US embargo; unconditionally 
supported Venezuelan President 
Nicolás Maduro in his conflict  
with Obama prior to the VII 
Summit of the Americas in 2015; 
strengthened ties with North Korea 
and asked the UN to eliminate 
sanctions against that country; and 
supported the Syrian government. 
Normalization is further 
obstructed by several factors: 
 
1. Politico-ideological opposition 
on both sides. 
Cuba’s leadership is not united: 
While some officials support the 
opening, hardline opponents fear 
that the end of the embargo would 
eliminate a handy scapegoat for 
Cuba’s economic problems or that 
the flood of tourists could unleash 
political and cultural trouble. Some 
of Cuba’s actions actually provide 
ammunition for US supporters of 
the embargo. According to the  
2015 survey quoted before, 97% of  
Cubans believe that the normalization 
process is good for the country. A 
backlash could occur if the process 
does not advance and people perceive  
their government as the culprit.
In the US, a bloc of eight Cuban- 
American members of Congress 
oppose Obama’s opening and the  
lifting of the embargo, including 
Republican Senators and presidential  
hopefuls Marco Rubio and Ted 
Cruz, and Democrat Robert 
Menéndez. Opposition in the 
House of Representatives includes 
Republicans Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 
Mario Díaz Balart, Alex Money and 
Carlos Curbelo, as well as Democrat 
Albio Sires. National surveys of the  
US population, however, consistently 
reveal widespread support for 
normalization of relations with  
Cuba and the lifting of the 
embargo. FIU’s own polls of Cuban 
Americans in South Florida have 
similar findings; the latest, in 
2014, reported 68% support for 
the reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations with Cuba and 52% for 
lifting the embargo. Fifty-three 
percent of registered voters said  
they would support a candidate  
in favor of restoring relations.  
 
Cienfuegos, Cuba - January 20, 2016: In cities and towns all over Cuba, crowds of people gather in parks and public squares to access public Internet. 
(TEKIN TURK DOGAN/iStock)
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2. Cuba’s economic capacity. 
Cuba has a low capacity to sustain 
trade with the US without subsidies 
and substantial credit. Some  
crucial facts: 
• The US economy is 226 times 
larger than Cuba’s; at 11 million, 
Cuba’s population is comparable 
to Ohio’s, but Cuba’s per capita 
income is 10% that of the  
US state. 
• Cuba’s economic growth 
in 2009–2014 averaged 2% 
annually—in 2014 it was 1.1%, 
ranked thirty-first among the 35 
countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
• Gross domestic investment was 
8.9% of GDP in 2013, compared 
to 26% in 1989 (prior to the 
“Special Period”) and 23% in the 
rest of Latin America.
• Agricultural growth averaged 
1% in 2010–2013. 
• The deficit in the trade balance 
of goods in 2013 was $9.4  
billion, the second biggest such 
deficit in Cuban history.
• The value of exports of goods 
has steadily declined since 2011, 
when it was already 12% below 
1985 levels.
• Cuba depends on Venezuela 
for about one-fourth of its GDP, 
a dangerous figure because 
of Venezuela’s dire economic 
situation (200% inflation, a 
projected 10% drop in GDP in 
2015, and the worst economic 
performance in the region). 
Under these circumstances,  
one would expect Cuba to do its 
part to push for normalization 
without yielding its sovereignty. 
 
3. US embargo. 
Since 1968 I have opposed the 
US embargo on Cuba based on 
arguments similar to those used 
by Obama on D17. In addition 
to the Helms-Burton Act, the 
Cuban Democracy Act prohibits 
sales to Cuba by subsidiaries of 
US corporations abroad, and the 
Reform of Sanctions on Trade and 
Exports Act bans travel to Cuba by 
US tourists. The major economic 
obstacle that Cuba faces is not the 
embargo. The island maintains trade 
with and investment from many 
countries in the world. The embargo 
does have a range of negative 
effects, including cumbersome 
foreign banking transactions, more 
expensive US goods bought from 
third countries and higher cargo 
costs; however, Cuba’s inefficient 
economic system and incapacity to 
generate exports to pay for imports 
are the fundamental hindrance. 
Recent reforms have been positive 
but slow, impeded by excessive 
regulations, controls, taxes and 
disincentives; so far, they have 
failed to produce tangible economic 
effects. Only the US Congress can 
lift the embargo, and to date it has 
ignored Obama’s request that it 
take this step. If the embargo were 
lifted, Cuba would receive many 
more US tourists, and probably 
credit, but it would have to honor 
its commitments or credit would 
vanish. Trade and investment 
with the US would help diversify 
trade and ease the island’s heavy 
dependence on Venezuela.
 
4. Tourism. 
Until recently, most US travelers 
to Cuba had to go in groups with 
an itinerary and a guide. Tourism 
is not allowed, so the itinerary 
cannot mix educational or religious 
activities with a day at the beach. 
Travel agencies and airlines cannot 
sell tourist packages; violators risk 
being fined. Individuals attending 
professional meetings or conducting 
research must have the credentials 
for these activities. To attract return 
visitors after the initial “discovery” 
flow, Cuba will have to improve  
the quality of its hotel infrastructure, 
services and amenities, as well as 
reduce the cost of renting a car. 
Cubana de Aviación will have to 
upgrade equipment before it can 
obtain permission to land at  
US airports. 
5. Trade and services. 
Current regulations ban Cuban 
exports of sugar, tobacco, rum, 
nickel, antique cars, live animals 
and animal products, vegetables, 
prepared food, chemicals, vessels, 
wool and cotton. Most of these 
goods are only produced by the 
state. Imports of US food declined 
44% in 2008–2015 for several 
reasons. First, the US does not 
provide credit to Cuba, shifting 
trade to Argentina, Brazil and Spain, 
which do. Second, a stronger dollar 
has made US goods less competitive, 
and third, US tariffs are high outside 
of trade associations. In the short 
run, Cuba will have a significant 
trade deficit with the United States 
due to the little it has to export, a 
situation that could threaten many 
Cuban enterprises. In addition, 
Cuba will have to compete with 
Latin American exporters that 
have a long relationship with the 
US and preferential treatment 
through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. To the best of my 
knowledge, the Cuban government 
has not yet authorized any US 
trade with the non-state sector.  
Particularly sensitive are imports  
of communication and electronic 
equipment. If trade is eventually 
authorized, it will probably be 
subjected to restrictions and  
high taxes. 
Cuba is a large exporter of 
professional services, including 
physicians, nurses and teachers. This 
sector contributes about $5 billion 
to the economy annually and is the 
leading source of hard currency. 
Paladares or private, small, family-run restaurants are 
now common across Cuba. Santa Clara's restaurant 
El Alba cooks traditional Cuban food exclusively with 
charcoal. (ROBERTO MACHADO NOA/LIGHT 
ROCKET/AFP/Getty Images)
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Main buyers are Venezuela and 
Brazil. Revenue from such services 
compensates for Cuba’s deficit in 
the trade of goods. Buying countries 
subsidize salaries, do not scrutinize 
training and credentials, and face no 
language barriers. Shifting part  
of those professionals to the US 
won’t be easy. 
 
6. Investment. 
At less than half the Latin American 
average, Cuba’s domestic investment 
is low and restricts economic 
growth, leading several Cuban 
economists to argue for the need 
for foreign investment in all sectors. 
Officially, Cuba requires between $2 
and $2.5 billion annually to jump-
start the economy into reasonable 
growth. To achieve this, the country 
implemented a new law on foreign 
investment in June 2014. The new 
law replaces regulations enacted in 
1995; among other things, it:
a) Extends foreign investment to 
all sectors except health, education 
and the army; b) Exempts taxes 
on personal income, the labor 
force, customs for certain imports, 
profits for eight years, and sales tax 
for a year; c) Permits the opening 
of accounts in freely convertible 
currency at foreign banks;  
d) Allows direct imports and exports 
(the previous law did as well, but 
in practice this did not occur); 
e) Limits the period to authorize 
or deny investments to 45 or 60 
days (no limit existed before, and 
the process often took years); f ) 
Authorizes enterprises with 100% 
shares of foreign capital (this was 
also in the previous law but the 
state had 51% of shares except for 
4% of total foreign investment); 
g) Allows investments by “legal 
persons” residing in Cuba as well as, 
apparently, Cubans residing abroad 
(although the latter is not clear); 
and h) Offers guarantees to foreign 
investors, including compensation 
in case of expropriation.
The law also maintains some 
incongruous rules. It does not 
permit free hiring of labor or 
transfer of property. Foreign 
investors cannot directly hire or 
dismiss their employees, but must 
instead go through a state agency. 
Investors disburse salaries in hard 
currency to the government, which 
in turn pays a fraction in pesos 
to workers (the exchange rate is 
24 pesos to one US dollar) and 
pockets the difference. Foreign 
investments may be expropriated 
for reasons of public utility or social 
interest, and in several cases conflict 
resolution has been left to local 
courts instead of the International 
Court of Arbitration. A survey of 
businessmen in 2015 pinpointed 
five factors that restrict freedom 
to invest in Cuba: 63% identified 
bureaucracy, 50% excessive 
regulations, 43% legal procedures 
and guarantees, 39% state enterprise 
inefficiency, and 34% financial risks. 
The latter concern was heightened in 
September 2014, three months after 
the investment law came into force, 
when Canadian Cy Tokmakjian - 
the biggest investor in Cuba - was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for 
corruption and his investments were 
confiscated. Five months later he 
was deported.
A magnet for foreign investment 
is the Special Development Zone 
of Mariel (ZEDM), established in 
2013. It offers better incentives than 
the 2014 investment law, including 
longer tax exemptions on profits and 
sales, and a special labor regime that 
allows agreements between foreign 
investors and the state agency  
on issues including wages. A 2014 
decree stipulates that workers  
receive 80% of the agreed wage,  
at a preferential exchange rate.
In 2014, a portfolio of opportunities  
for foreign investment listed 246 
projects worth $8.7 million. It 
allowed foreign investors to partner 
with cooperatives but not the self-
employed, who account for 64% of 
non-state activities. The portfolio set 
25 priorities for foreign investment, 
including 36 projects in hightech, 
manufacturing and business 
oriented to export in the ZEDM; 
energy; and construction of two 
cement plants and 12 new hotels.  
A new version of the portfolio, 
released in November 2015, identifies  
326 investment areas and specific 
priorities: access to advanced 
technology, substitution of food 
imports, expansion of exports, 
tourism, energy, mining, industrial 
infrastructure and biotechnology. 
In March 2015, 120 investment 
projects from China, South Korea, 
Western Europe, Japan, and 
Vietnam (including Toyota and 
Hyundai) had been submitted  
to Cuba, but no contracts had  
been signed. The number of such 
projects grew by 757% from  
D17 to April 2015, but as of 
November only eight agreements 
had been subscribed.
 
7. US and Cuban claims. 
Claims by US citizens for 
property confiscated by the Cuban 
government total $7 billion, in 
addition to $12 billion in claims 
by Cuban Americans. Cuba 
recognizes US citizens’ claims but 
rejects those of Cuban émigrés. In 
turn, Cuba claims $180 billion in 
reparation for damages inflicted by 
the US embargo; the government 
provides an annual estimate of these 
damages, but many categories are 
questionable, including the loss of 
trade opportunities. A settlement 
on mutual claims would probably 
have to precede the lifting of the 
embargo. Both sides could decide to 
cancel their claims, but in that case 
the US would have to compensate 
the losses of its citizens. Other 
alternatives include reducing the 
value of claims to a portion of their 
nominal value, Cuba waiving or 
substantially lowering its claims, 
and a debt-for-investment tradeoff 
subordinated to the lifting of the 
embargo. Cuba also demands an 
end to broadcasts by Radio and 
TV Martí; calls for rescinding the 
Cuban Adjustment Act, which 
grants asylum to Cuban émigrés 
who touch US soil; and rejects  
any changes to the political system 
or discussions on human and 
political rights. 
III. GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
AND POOR SHORT-TERM 
ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
One year is not enough to assess 
the outcome of normalization but, 
as the previous analysis shows, 
the initial great expectations for 
a rapid and fruitful economic 
rapprochement were not founded 
on solid knowledge of the situation’s 
complexity and extant barriers. 
Despite Obama’s positive and 
daring steps, the embargo is still 
a formidable obstacle. The new 
US regulations try to support the 
non-state sector on the island with 
more remittances and trade, as well 
as promote wider communications 
through electronic exports, the 
Internet and “people-to-people” 
travel. Havana has not given the 
green light, continuing to pursue 
its goal of state free trade with 
and investment from the US. 
Raúl Castro initially welcomed 
the opening but has followed up 
with antagonistic gestures that give 
ammunition to active supporters of 
the embargo in the US. His attitude 
is also baffling in view of the 
precarious economic conditions in 
Venezuela, which contributes one-
quarter of Cuba’s GDP, and the lack 
of other powerful nations willing 
and able to replace Venezuela in a 
worst-case scenario. With Obama’s 
second term drawing to an end, 
a narrow window of opportunity 
remains to reach major agreements, 
especially as no one can predict 
the attitude of the next president 
toward normalization. Raúl Castro 
has announced his retirement in 
February 2018; if the next person in 
the White House is not as amenable 
as Obama, there won’t be a chance 
for Cuba’s leader to settle with 
the US. Finally, the Cuban people 
are overwhelmingly in favor of 
normalization and, if it fails and the 
leadership is perceived as the culprit, 
a backlash is possible. The key 
question, therefore, is: Why hasn’t 
Cuba been more eager for an opening? 
It is understandable that Cuba 
wants to keep links with its allies in 
Latin America, Russia and China 
and avoid giving the impression that 
it has capitulated to the US. But 
some actions appear unwarranted, 
such as the outspoken declarations 
of support for North Korea and 
Syria. Public repetition of demands 
on the US could be explained as 
bargaining chips but actually are 
counterproductive; they fail to  
move the process forward and  
would be more appropriate for  
the negotiation table. 
Presidents Ford, Carter and 
Clinton started negotiations with 
Cuba under Fidel Castro, only to 
have them aborted by actions that 
torpedoed the process. I have shown 
elsewhere that Fidel did not want a 
thaw with the US because it would 
mean losing key tools of the regime: 
the enemy and the embargo. Raúl 
is a pragmatist; he offered multiple 
times to meet Obama and finally 
reached an agreement with him  
on D17. 
The enigma of Raúl’s attitude on 
normalization echoes his puzzling 
behavior on structural reform, which 
has been slow, contradictory, and 
without tangible economic effects. 
Plausible explanations include the 
divisions within the leadership 
and fears that reform will unleash 
an unstoppable trend toward a 
market economy and political 
trouble that could destabilize the 
regime. And yet, the alternative 
is worse, particularly if Venezuela 
should collapse. Cuba should move 
forward with structural reforms 
and rapprochement with the US. 
Negotiations cannot succeed if both 
parties do not give up a little, and an 
unyielding attitude by one partner 
could derail the entire process. 
 
Carmelo Mesa-Lago is  
Distinguished Service Professor 
Emeritus of Economics and Latin 
American Studies at the University  
of Pittsburgh.
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A momentous occasion indeed: August 14, 2015, the raising of the American flag to  inaugurate the new 
US embassy in Havana, something 
of a mirror image of the raising of 
the Cuban flag on May 20, 1902 
to inaugurate the new republic. It 
was very difficult not to be swept up 
in the exhilaration of the moment, 
and certainly not the time to allow 
objective reality mar a subjective 
mood: Just as May 20, 1902 was not 
the day to dwell on a new republic 
without the capacity to exercise 
national sovereignty and self-
determination, August 14, 2015 was 
not the time to call attention to a 
new US policy pursuing old politics.
The euphoria greeting the 
US-Cuba rapprochement was 
as widespread as it was widely 
shared. “Historic diplomatic 
rapprochement,” exulted The New 
York Times, promising to lead to 
“full normalization of relations.” 
The restoration of diplomatic ties, 
pronounced the Los Angeles Times, 
represented a major advance in 
“normalizing relations between the 
US and Cuba.” Secretary of State 
John Kerry heralded the resumption 
of diplomatic ties as a step closer 
“to restoring fully normal relations 
between the United States and Cuba.”
These were promising months of 
reconciliation after dismal years of 
rancor, to be sure. But it is also true 
that formidable obstacles remain in 
the way of “fully normal relations 
between the United States and 
Cuba.” Most immediately, the  
embargo remains in place. Radio  
and TV Martí continue broadcasting. 
The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act 
remains unchanged. And, lastly, the 
United States retains control of the 
Guantánamo Naval Station, built on 
territory seized in 1901.
However formidable these 
obstacles may appear to be, they are 
not insurmountable. Each could be 
remedied and resolved through the 
exertion of political will and the 
exercise of good faith. The most 
troublesome obstacles to “normal 
relations” are not found in the 
present, but in the past, over 200 
years of history during which the 
presumption of entitlement has 
developed into the default template 
from which US policy toward Cuba  
is fashioned.
Cuba and the United States 
moved toward rapprochement 
within two different paradigms of 
“normal relations.” The Cubans  
engaged the process of normalization 
within an explicit protocol of 
mutual respect; in the words of 
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez, 
“on the basis of respect and equality, 
without any prejudice to the 
independence and sovereignty of 
Cuba, and without any interference 
in our internal affairs.” The 
Americans unabashedly pursued 
“normal relations” as a matter of 
instrumental purpose, as a means 
to change Cuba, restructure the 
economy, reform its political system 
and reorganize the character of 
Cuban society; that is, to do what 
the United States has always done: 
insert itself into Cuban internal 
affairs to shape the course of Cuban 
developments. “We would hope to 
bring about change in the regime,”  
Assistant Secretary of State Roberta 
Jacobson acknowledged. 
For a brief moment on July 20, 
2015—the date that the United 
States and Cuba restored diplomatic 
relations and reopened embassies 
in each other’s capitals—Secretary 
of State John Kerry seemed to 
have subscribed to the paradigm 
of Cuban sovereignty and self-
determination. “Cuba’s future is for 
Cubans to shape,” Kerry declared. 
“Responsibility for the nature 
and quality of governance and 
accountability rests, as it should, not 
with any outside entity; but solely 
within the citizens of this country.” 
Sadly, Kerry’s statement did not 
end there. “But,” he continued, 
“the leaders in Havana—and the 
Cuban people—should know 
that the United States will always 
remain a champion of democratic 
principles and reforms… We remain 
convinced the people of Cuba 
would be best served by genuine 
democracy, where people are free 
to choose their leaders, express 
their ideas, practice their faith…
where institutions are answerable 
to those they serve; and where civil 
society is independent and allowed 
to flourish.” In tone and tenor, in 
hubris and chutzpah, in the breezy 
New Policy, Old Politics: 
Change and Changelessness in  
US-Cuba Relations 
by Louis A. Pérez, Jr.
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way that self-righteous certainty 
presumes selfless moral purpose—
“the people of Cuba would be best 
served”—Secretary Kerry’s thinly 
veiled rebuke to Cuba set the US 
purpose in relief. 
The “license” of power is perhaps 
impossible to revoke; it informs 
the very history from which the 
powerful obtain moral validation, 
from which the warrant of power 
assumes such utter commonplace 
normality as to take on the 
appearance of the natural order of 
things, hardly noticed at all except as 
a confirmation that all is right with 
the world. The sight of Assistant 
Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson 
in Havana in January 2015 engaged 
in public sympathetic interaction 
with Cuban dissidents could not 
but give pause. One could only 
imagine the howls of indignation 
in the United States if an official 
Cuban delegation arranged a public 
meeting with representatives of 
Occupy Wall Street. A similar 
moment came in September 2015, 
when, in summarizing the exchange 
between Presidents Obama and 
Castro at the United Nations, 
the US press secretary related 
that Obama had “reaffirmed our 
commitment to seeing that the 
Cuban government do a better job 
of not just respecting, but actually 
proactively protecting the basic 
human rights of the Cuban people.” 
No doubt an exhortation from 
Castro that the US government “do 
a better job” of protecting the lives 
of African-American men from the 
police would not have been received 
calmly in US political circles.
US policy has been conditioned 
by 200 years of history during 
which the Americans have presumed 
proprietary authority to manage 
Cuban internal affairs, shape 
outcomes and prescribe what “best 
serves” the interests of the Cuban 
people. Informing this stance is the 
moral conviction that the United 
States has the right—indeed, the 
duty—to guide the affairs of Cubans 
for their own best interests and that 
the Cubans have the obligation to 
accede to US guidance. 
Cuba engages the United States 
to defend historic claims to national 
sovereignty and self-determination. 
The United States renews relations 
with Cuba to “bring about change 
in the regime.” These two versions 
of “normal relations” will be 
difficult to reconcile and portend 
the continuation of adversarial 
tensions. Part of the problem is 
that no usable models exist for 
“normal relations” between the US 
and Cuba. For nearly 200 years, 
“normal” has meant a presumption 
of US authority to impose its will 
on Cuba. The historic model of 
“normal relations” casts the United 
States in the role of the arbiter of 
Cuban destiny—always in the name 
of what “best serves” the interests of 
the Cuban people. Plus ça change…
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., is J. Carlyle 
Sitterson Professor of History and 
Director of the Institute for the Study 
of the Americas at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Secretary of State John Kerry (R) watches as Marines raise the American flag at the reopening of the US Embassy on August 14, 2015 in Havana, Cuba. 
Kerry’s visit was the first by a US secretary of state since 1945 and a symbolic act after the two former Cold War enemies reestablished diplomatic relations 
in July. (CHIP SOMODEVILLA/AFP/Getty Images)
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Diplomatic Normality  
and Its Enemies
by Rafael Rojas
One of the most striking aspects of the negotiation process initiated by the governments 
of the United States and Cuba in 
early 2015 has been its explicit 
adherence to the realistic canon 
of contemporary international 
relations. Both governments, since the 
concurrent statements by Barack 
Obama and Raúl Castro on 
December 17, 2014, agreed that 
they would negotiate without 
renouncing divergent principles that 
put national interests above ideology. 
The teams led by Vice Minister 
Josefina Vidal and Assistant Secretary 
Roberta Jacobson respected that 
basic agreement, whose goal was a 
theoretical consensus between two 
states with differing ideologies.
The realist school of international 
theory, starting with Hans Morgenthau 
and his classic Politics among Nations  
(1948) and rearticulated in the last 
decades of the twentieth century 
in the works of Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, was a doctrinal 
current essentially linked to the 
context of the Cold War. A central 
motivation of Morgenthau, a 
German Jewish intellectual and 
University of Chicago professor 
during World War II, was to explain 
relations between states through 
what he called “interest defined 
in terms of power” rather than 
the ideological confrontation that 
monopolized the public sphere 
during the Cold War. Echoing 
Machiavelli and Marx, Weber and 
Freud, Morgenthau argued that 
the reality of international relations 
was hiding behind the façade of 
ideology. Morgenthau, who closely 
observed the conflict between the 
United States and Cuba, especially 
during the Bay of Pigs invasion and 
the Missile Crisis, later wrote that 
John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro 
had acted rationally according 
to their respective interests. The 
old master’s observation angered 
politicians and intellectuals involved 
in the ideological battles of the Cold 
War. One of his critics was Maurice 
Halperin, a former agent of the 
Soviet NKVD and the American 
OSS (the forerunner of the CIA), 
who had advised Fidel Castro 
and Che Guevara in Cuba in the 
mid-sixties. After breaking with 
the Cuban government, Halperin 
accused Morgenthau of naivety in his 
analysis, because it underestimated 
the potential irrationality of an actor 
such as Fidel Castro. 
Like all conflicts inherited from 
the Cold War, the dispute between 
the United States and Cuba has 
an ideological dimension that is 
impossible to hide. One only has  
to take a quick look at the domestic 
and international policies of the 
two actors in the confrontation 
to appreciate their contradictory 
global and regional strategies and 
profiles. Ideology cannot be excluded 
from the analysis of this conflict: 
Not only do both states assign it a 
central role within their policies but 
also, after more than half a century, 
their dispute has molded the values, 
discourses, practices and even 
temperaments of the  
communities involved.
Despite the differences and 
asymmetries between the two nations, 
their governments have been able 
to understand each other, restore 
relations and outline a protocol for 
diplomatic normalization. While 
much remains to be done to satisfy 
the central demands of each party, 
the protocol itself is a major step in 
signaling the willingness to negotiate 
of two actors at odds for too long. 
This progress is even more 
notable when one considers that 
the Cuban government is headed 
by a historic leader of the 1959 
Revolution and one of the main 
architects of the Communist 
political and legal system that has 
characterized the island for the 
past 55 years. This government 
brokered Cuba’s inscription within 
the Soviet bloc, radically changing 
the hemispheric system and making 
the island the target not only of 
hostile policies of all kinds, but 
also the closest approximation to 
a nuclear holocaust in the West so 
far. The state that was built after the 
Revolution has produced a foreign 
policy unprecedented in its global 
activism among any Latin American 
or Caribbean country, and Cuba was 
the only socialist state within the 
Soviet bloc to openly reject the fall  
of the Berlin wall, the breakdown 
of the USSR and the transition to 
democracy in Eastern Europe.
On the US side, in contrast, the 
negotiations were led by President 
Barack Obama, toward the end of 
his second term and with a polarized 
Congress controlled by a Republican 
majority. This ideological polarity 
motivated America’s first African-
American president to rely more  
on executive orders to reshape  
US domestic and international 
policy, as evidenced by such  
examples as the Affordable Care  
Act, immigration, the nuclear 
deal with Iran, estrangement from 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s government 
in Israel and, of course, the 
restoration of relations with Cuba. 
Obama has pinned his hopes on 
these initiatives as his legacy and 
for his party’s chances for keeping 
control of the White House in the 
2016 presidential elections.
Despite the rational motives 
of each actor, however, neither 
is univocal and both are subject 
to pressures and interests from 
their immediate environment and 
geopolitical partners. At least three 
pockets of resistance oppose the 
reestablishment of relations between 
the United States and Cuba: (1) 
Congressional Republicans, especially 
Cuban-American senators and 
representatives of both parties, who 
are reluctant to consider constructive 
ties with left-leaning Latin American 
and Caribbean governments; (2) the 
segment of the Cuban government 
that is most resistant to change and 
skeptical of the reforms Raúl Castro 
has introduced over the past three 
years; and (3) some currents of the 
Latin American left, especially those 
identifying with the Bolivarian 
Revolution, which are not eager 
to see an understanding between 
Washington and Havana.
To understand these tensions, it 
is useful to look back to the work 
of Cuban philosopher and essayist 
Jorge Mañach, who was exiled to 
Puerto Rico in the summer of 1960 
following his disenchantment with 
the Cuban Revolution’s turn toward 
Communism. At the University of 
Puerto Rico in Río Piedras, hosted 
by Chancellor Jaime Benítez, 
Mañach delivered a series of lectures 
on the Caribbean as a border 
between the two Americas that later 
appeared under the title Teoría de la 
frontera (1970), a posthumous and 
unfinished work prefaced by Concha 
Meléndez. In these talks, Mañach 
portrayed many of the protagonists 
in the conflict between the United 
States and Cuba as carriers of an idea 
of the border as an edge or limit, 
boundary or partition, when, he 
suggested, it could best be thought  
of as a “friction surface.”
Mañach was keenly aware of the 
asymmetry between the United 
States and its Caribbean neighbors. 
The Caribbean islands, in his view, 
represented an “uneven border.”  
“When a village is underdeveloped, 
as is now said, in the vicinity of a 
powerful nation, or equipped with 
different cultural elements..., the 
border necessarily implies something 
insecure and precarious,” Mañach 
noted. When one abandons the 
idea of the border as a “friction 
surface,” he explained, countries 
“lose the ability to communicate, 
giving rise to arrogance on one hand 
and resentment on the other.” The 
function of borders in this context 
is limited to “preserving as much as 
possible the respective integrities, 
enclosing the two human groups in  
their corresponding places” (Teoría de 
la frontera, p. 43).
Mañach cited the ideas of Argentine 
economist Raúl Prebisch, the founder  
of ECLAC, in suggesting that increased 
economic activity was the key to 
leveling the border: “studying our 
natural resources, adopting modern 
techniques and saving habits, 
integrating markets, implementing 
internal systems of distribution 
and diversification of agricultural 
property, and industrializing.  
Above all, imposing on ourselves 
healthy forms of democratic political 
and social discipline.”
Today’s analysts may not use the 
same terminology as Mañach, but 
his idea of the border as a “friction 
surface” remains a valuable lens for 
viewing the challenge of diplomatic 
normalization between the United 
States and Cuba. 
Rafael Rojas is a Research Professor of 
History at the Center for Economic 
Research and Teaching (CIDE) in  
Mexico City.
Jorge Mañach, writer, scholar and statesman. (SERGE BALKIN/CONDE NAST/AFP/Getty Images)
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US-Cuba Relations:  
Waiting for Real Change
by Nora Gámez Torres
A year after D17, President Barack Obama explained the theory behind the change in US policy 
toward Cuba, which had remained 
almost untouched for half a century. 
“Our original theory… was not that 
we were going to see immediate 
changes or loosening of the control 
of the Castro regime, but rather that 
over time you’d lay the predicates 
for substantial transformation,” the 
president said in an interview with 
Yahoo News. 
The results, however, haven’t kept 
up with the enthusiasm generated 
by the event, especially among US 
entrepreneurs. Apart from Airbnb 
and telephone companies such as 
Sprint, few have benefitted from 
the opening. Cuba’s removal from 
the US list of state sponsors of 
terrorism and the reappearance of 
embassies in the capitals of both 
countries are the results with the 
most symbolic and political weight 
so far. Cuba has made political 
hay out of its removal from the 
terrorism blacklist, but the United 
States did not attain a comparable 
achievement in 2015. According to a 
State Department official I spoke to 
via teleconference, direct mail, civil 
aviation, environmental protection, 
and the fight against drug trafficking 
are all subjects on which agreements 
have already been achieved or could 
be achieved soon.
A day before the first anniversary 
of D17, the two countries announced 
an understanding aimed at the 
resumption of commercial flights to  
the island, but acknowledged that 
the negotiations will take months. 
The talks have stalled over million-
dollar claims in US courts to 
compensate victims of the Cuban 
government’s actions. An agreement 
on compensation, rugged and 
difficult though it may be, will be a 
vital part of ensuring a real possibility 
for US companies to invest and 
operate normally in Cuba.
The island’s government has 
yet to respond to most of the 
incentives provided by the United 
States. The Obama administration 
has promulgated new regulations 
authorizing US institutions and 
companies to have a “physical 
presence” in the country, open bank 
accounts and hire Cuban employees. 
In theory, US companies could 
also begin exporting materials and 
supplies to self-employed Cubans. 
To date, however, the Cuban 
government has not even opened a 
wholesale market for small business 
owners and continues to monopolize 
all commercial activity.
For many US entrepreneurs eager 
to invest, the slow reaction of the 
island’s government seems puzzling. 
Even one of Fidel Castro’s own 
children, Alex Castro Soto del Valle, 
has complained that the process of 
change in Cuba is "too slow" because 
of bureaucracy, the objections of  
a “conservative” wing in the 
government, and corruption.
On the US side, despite efforts 
to lobby Congress, the embargo 
and the travel ban to Cuba for 
most US citizens remain in effect. 
Nevertheless, as James Williams, 
a lobbyist in favor of lifting the 
embargo, notes, “while there are  
still many challenges in relation to 
US policy toward Cuba, we’ve  
made more progress in one year  
than in decades.”
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno 
Rodríguez has criticized Obama’s 
measures as “very limited,” and  
the government has made 
ending an embargo a condition 
of “normalization.” Even in this 
country, legal experts such as Stephen 
Propst point out that the Obama 
administration could further expand 
the categories of allowed travel 
to Cuba and facilitate financial 
transactions, among other measures 
intended to relax the sanctions.
Obama might be inclined to do 
so if, as he told Yahoo News, the 
Cuban government accelerated its 
own reforms. At the same time, he 
seems to be taking into account 
criticism from Cuban exiles and 
members of Congress—above all, 
Cuban American senators and 
representatives—that his policy 
offers an “economic lifeline” to the 
island’s government. The president 
has promised to be “selective” and 
“cautious” in exercising his executive 
authority to promote economic 
change to avoid benefiting the 
“cronies of the regime.” 
The Island’s Political Climate
On December 10, 2015, 
International Human Rights Day, 
the Cuban authorities arrested more 
than 150 members of peaceful 
dissent movements. Cuban-
American congresswoman Ileana 
Ros-Lehtinen—one of the leading 
critics of the United States’ new 
Cuba policy—took the opportunity 
to reproach President Obama that 
“countless economic and political 
incentives have not stopped these 
authoritarian people from clinging 
to power,” a reference to “the Castro 
brothers and their henchmen.” Cuba 
remains a country of great contrasts 
and no miraculous announcement 
will change the island’s political 
reality overnight. Obama himself 
foresaw this problem from the start, 
and reiterated in December 2015 
that he will continue to “press” 
to improve the human rights 
situation on the island. Raúl Castro, 
whom Obama described not as 
an “ideologue” but a “pragmatist,” 
although one “very committed to 
the existing regime,” promised early 
on to the Cuban National Assembly 
that, during negotiations with the 
United States, he would require 
“respect” for the political system 
established since 1959.
In sum, 2015 was a year with 
“positive and negative results” for 
the Cuban opposition, human 
rights activist Antonio Rodiles 
acknowledges. After freeing around 
50 political prisoners earlier in 2015, 
the Cuban regime continued to 
arrest opponents on a large scale. 
(As of November 2015, the Cuban 
Commission for Human Rights and 
National Reconciliation reported 
7,686 arrests). At the same time, 
however, dissidents have managed 
to give visibility to their demands 
through social media campaigns such 
as #TodosMarchamos (advocating 
for the freedom of all political 
prisoners), #Cubadecide (calling 
for a plebiscite), or the hundreds of 
videos the Patriotic Union of Cuba 
(UNPACU) posts on YouTube. 
Rodiles has been one of the most 
critical opponents of normalization 
and has taken the opportunity to 
express his views in Washington 
at Congressional hearings. The 
diplomatic turn taken by the United 
States has created a clear distinction 
within the Cuban opposition 
between those who support the new 
US policy and those who do not. 
Who Wins the Game?
If this were a game of chess, the 
Cuban government could be said 
to hold an advantageous position. 
It has secured the release of three 
of its intelligence agents, who were 
received back home as heroes. 
The United States has removed 
Cuba from its list of state sponsors 
of terrorism, issued a series of 
regulations to stimulate trade and 
travel to Cuba, and expressed a 
willingness to continue negotiations 
with Havana on multiple issues. 
Cuba has also drawn the attention  
of the business community.
But an early advantage doesn’t 
mean a solid position on the board. 
The Obama administration has 
a few months to make its legacy 
“irreversible” and will demand more 
than promises and meetings every 
three months. The enthusiasm of 
entrepreneurs could likewise fade 
unless Cuba enacts the legal reforms 
necessary to guarantee property and 
investments, unify its currency and 
allow the direct hiring of employees, 
key concerns of the business 
delegations that visited the island in 
2015. It could decide to take these 
steps, but some measures require 
modifying Cuba’s Constitution. 
Any transcendental policy change 
would have to be approved by the 
Communist Party, during its 7th 
Congress in April 2016.
The end of 2015, with the 
devastating defeat suffered by 
Chavism in Venezuela, brought 
great uncertainty to Cuba. If the 
Venezuelan opposition, which took 
control of the country’s National 
Assembly, decides to cut back on 
oil subsidies to Cuba, the island 
could lose the equivalent of a quarter 
of its economy and 35% of its 
foreign trade, economist Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago has warned. This could 
accelerate the pace of reforms and 
US rapprochement. 
Obama raised the stakes in 
December 2015 when he said that 
he was “very interested” in visiting 
Cuba in 2016, but only if the 
“conditions are right.” Obama added 
that he would like to see progress in 
achieving “freedom and possibilities 
for ordinary Cubans” and asked to 
meet with dissidents and activists, 
conditions sure to displease the 
island’s government. Stronger 
demand for human rights could 
content the many Cuban Americans 
who still mistrust the turn in US 
policy toward Cuba, mostly because 
of the scarce political results it has 
achieved in this area and respect for 
civil liberties. Obama only has until 
the end of 2016 to prove that his 
policy is not just a promise but rather 
a risky bet with potential benefits 
both for Cuba and the US. 
Nora Gámez Torres has a PhD in 
sociology and is a journalist at El 
Nuevo Herald.
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The Cuban-American  
Community after D17
by Jorge Duany
The reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba has raised numerous 
opportunities and challenges for 
both countries, including US citizens 
of Cuban origin, particularly those 
residing in South Florida. Here I will 
assess some of the main economic 
repercussions of the changes in US-
Cuba relations for Cuban Americans. 
Let me begin with some brief 
background on the recent emergence  
of a private, or non-state, sector of 
Cuba’s economy, usually referred 
to as trabajo por cuenta propia 
(self-employment). In May 2015, 
the Cuban government reported 
504,613 self-employed workers, or 
approximately 10% of the island’s 
labor force. Most of these workers 
were employed in three service 
sectors linked to the tourist industry: 
paladares (small family restaurants), 
casas particulares (bed-and-breakfast 
rentals to foreigners), and private 
taxis, including bicitaxis, cocotaxis 
and almendrones, as Cubans call 
vintage American cars. Other 
authorized private businesses  
include beauty and barber shops,  
car repair, construction, and repair  
of electrical appliances.
According to a 2014 survey by 
Maybell Padilla Pérez, one-third 
of the startup capital for these 
businesses originates in Cuban-
American remittances, technically 
defined as transfers of money by 
migrants from the United States 
to family members on the island. 
Significant informal “investment” 
(through remittances) is already 
taking place in Cuba, but is not 
yet officially recognized by either 
the Cuban or US governments. 
At present, small-scale Cuban 
businesses, operated by family 
owners, are the main target for 
“investment” by Cuban-American 
entrepreneurs. According to the 
Havana Consulting Group in Miami, 
Cubans living outside the island sent 
$3.13 billion in total remittances to 
their relatives back home in 2014. 
Forty-eight percent of all Cuban 
Americans interviewed in the 2014 
FIU Cuba Poll sent money to Cuba. 
According to Katrin Hansing and 
Manuel Orozco, about half (47%) 
sent money to Cuba by conventional 
methods (i.e., wire transfers through 
Western Union), while the other 
half (50%) used informal means 
(i.e., family members or mulas—
unlicensed remittance carriers—
traveling back home).
Cuban-American contributions to 
Cuba’s economy are not restricted 
to remittances. Cuban émigrés also 
finance nearly 70% of Cuba’s cell 
phone market, which amounted to 
more than three million phones in 
2015. Cuban Americans make more 
than 50 million telephone calls per 
year to Cuba, and Cubans living 
abroad send millions of dollars in 
packages, including food, clothes, 
medicine and other assets. Nearly 
half a million Cuban Americans 
traveled to Cuba in 2013. They 
took with them merchandise worth 
millions of dollars, such as electrical 
appliances, spare parts, and other 
items used to develop and maintain 
businesses on the island. When 
Cuban Americans travel to Cuba, 
they often stay in casas particulares, 
eat in paladares, and purchase other 
goods and services produced by self-
employed workers (cuentapropistas). 
In short, Cuban Americans are 
currently making a substantial 
contribution to the development 
of small private businesses in 
Cuba and, therefore, to improved 
living conditions for the island’s 
population. Recent changes in US-
Cuba relations are likely to expand 
opportunities for Cuban-American 
remittances, travel, communication 
and investment in Cuba.
What is the potential role of 
Cuban-American remittances in the 
island’s economy? In 2015, about a 
third of Cubans polled by Bendixen 
and Amandi on the island said 
they received money from relatives 
and friends living abroad. Most 
of the money Cuban Americans 
send is spent on daily household 
subsistence needs in Cuba, such as 
food, medicine and housing repairs. 
Some remittance recipients are able 
to save a portion of the money and 
purchase assets such as cell phones, 
cars, machinery and computers. In 
Bendixen and Amandi’s poll, 11% 
of respondents said they invested 
their remittances in productive 
activities, including setting up and 
sustaining small private businesses 
such as beauty parlors, cafeterias 
and cocotaxis. Many of the most 
successful businesses in Cuba today 
(including several paladares) were 
established with dollars sent by 
relatives living overseas. The money 
is often used to purchase goods, 
repair and remodel facilities, and 
meet payroll demands. A 2011 study 
by Orozco and Hansing found that 
remittances financed 27% of the day-
to-day operations of small businesses  
in Cuba.
More broadly, the massive transfer 
of money from Cubans in the 
United States has a multiplying 
effect on the Cuban economy by 
bolstering consumer demand, 
particularly in agriculture, retail 
trade, communications, construction 
and, more recently, real estate. 
Remittances are now the second 
or third source of foreign currency 
on the island, after the export of 
professional services and tourism. 
They are part of a broad-based 
transnational economy that operates 
(largely informally) between Cuba 
and Florida, including retail trade, 
telecommunications, real estate and 
many kinds of services. 
The potential impact of improved 
US-Cuba relations on Cuban 
Americans depends largely on their 
attitudes toward the restoration 
of official ties between the two 
countries. Several polls conducted 
after December 17, 2014 have 
documented that many, if not 
most, Cuban Americans supported 
reestablishing diplomatic relations 
with Cuba. For instance, in a Miami 
Herald poll published on December 
19, 2014, 44% of respondents 
favored normalization, while 48% 
opposed it (with a 4.1% margin 
of error). In a national US poll 
conducted by Bendixen and Amandi 
in March 2015, 51% of Cuban 
Americans favored normalizing 
relations with Cuba. Support for 
reestablishing diplomatic ties was 
even higher outside of Florida: 
69%. In December 2015, another 
Bendixen and Amandi poll found 
that 56% of Cuban Americans 
agreed with President Obama’s 
decision to normalize relations  
with Cuba.
The 2014 FIU Cuba Poll, 
conducted in May 2014, found that 
two-thirds of the Cuban-American 
population in Miami Dade County 
favored diplomatic ties with the 
island. Several other significant 
findings also emerged:
• Over time, more and more 
Cuban Americans in Miami have 
supported renewing diplomatic ties 
with Cuba—from 20% in 1991 to 
68% in 2014. 
• Fifty-seven percent of registered 
voters would likely vote for a 
candidate in favor of replacing the 
embargo with a policy of increased 
support for independent  
business owners.
• Fifty-five percent of the  
interviewees would invest in  
Cuban independent enterprises.
• Although split almost evenly 
on the question of the embargo, 
most Cuban Americans favor 
unrestricted travel, remittances,  
Ramón Cruz, who left Cuba three years ago, visits a Check Cashing USA store in the Little Havana neighborhood of Miami, Florida to send a $300 
wire transfer via Western Union to his mother who still lives on the island. (JOE RAEDLE/AFP/Getty Images)
26 Hemisphere Volume 25 Hemisphere Volume 25 27
ReportsReports
the sale of food and medicine, and 
other kinds of trade with Cuba.
What legal and policy measures 
might promote the participation of 
Cuban-American businesses in the 
emerging private sector of the Cuban 
economy? An important first step is 
for the Cuban government to clarify 
the legal rights and obligations of 
Cubans living abroad. The latest 
legislation on foreign investment 
in Cuba does not specifically 
prohibit Cubans living abroad 
from investing in the island (and 
some Cuban officials have publicly 
expressed that they would welcome 
such an investment), but it remains 
ambiguous on the issue. Cuba must 
also provide stronger legal guarantees 
for “foreign” investors (including 
Cuban-American entrepreneurs). 
Travel, visa and remittance 
regulations should be more flexible 
and less expensive. Cuba’s official 
recognition of dual citizenship for 
Cuban Americans would probably 
facilitate their participation in 
the Cuban economy. In addition, 
experts have recommended that the 
government authorize all economic 
activities—including professional 
services—in the self-employed 
sector, and allow more employees 
per business. In the political realm, 
greater tolerance for diversity  
of opinion and respect for human  
rights in Cuba would certainly 
encourage Cuban-American 
investment in the island. 
On the US side, lifting the 
embargo of Cuba will be necessary 
for a full normalization of US-Cuba 
trade relations. This is unlikely to 
occur before 2017, with Republicans 
in control of Congress. In the 
meantime, recent US amendments 
to regulations governing trade 
with Cuba have facilitated the 
entrance of US (including Cuban-
American) businesses to the Cuban 
market, especially in agriculture, 
transportation, telecommunications, 
finance and even education. 
Nevertheless, numerous legal and 
policy measures still restrict the  
flow of people, capital, merchandise, 
information and technology between 
Cuba and the United States.
To sum up, Cuban Americans 
will probably be one of the key 
social actors in the reconstruction 
of the Cuban economy after the 
restoration of diplomatic relations 
between Cuba and the United 
States. They are already sending 
large sums of money, purchasing 
goods, transferring technology and 
consuming services in the private 
sector of the Cuban economy. The 
role of Cuban-American remittances 
could be even more significant 
in the near future as a source of 
funding for independent business 
growth on the island. In several 
public opinion polls, most Cuban 
Americans have expressed strong 
support for the reestablishment 
of US-Cuba diplomatic ties and 
the expansion of the private sector 
on the island. Maximizing the 
potential contribution of Cuban 
Americans to the Cuban economy, 
however, will require substantial 
changes to the laws and regulations 
established by both the Cuban and 
US governments, especially the 
lifting of remaining trade, investment 
and travel sanctions. Perhaps then, 
economic exchanges between Cubans 
living on and off the island will 
become smoother and achieve their 
full potential. 
Jorge Duany is Director of the Cuban 
Research Institute and Professor of 
Anthropology in the Department of 
Global and Sociocultural Studies at 
Florida International University.
Ñoooo Qué Barato! is a discount store in Hialeah, Florida and popular shopping 
destination for Miami Cubans who buy inexpensive items to send to family and friends 
on the island. Para Cuba Lo Tenemos Todo is their tagline. (JUAN MONINO/iStock)
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Rubén Valladares just might be one of the most important entrepreneurs in Cuba.No, he’s not a tourism 
tycoon. He’s not a tech titan.
Truth is, he makes…paper bags.
“But we are the biggest provider 
of bags in Cuba,” says Valladares, 
a slender, middle-aged man who 
finishes his sentences with the sort  
of raspy chuckle that helps people  
get through each trying day on  
this island.
Valladares is especially proud of 
the gift bags he made for President 
Obama’s historic visit to Havana in 
March 2016. They sport Obama’s 
face between Cuban and US flags 
with a message in English: It’s Time. 
Welcome to Cuba.
On the flip side is the logo of 
Valladares’s packaging company, 
Adorgraf, as well as an unabashed 
commercial message borrowed  
from the new normalization of  
US-Cuba ties: “The First To Package 
A New Relationship.”
Bags this nice don’t pay for 
themselves, after all.
That’s the sort of business acumen 
that changed Valladares’s life four 
years ago. He was a middle manager 
making a middling salary at a state-
run Cuban firm printing business 
cards. One day a shop owner picked 
up his order and mentioned he 
couldn’t find anyone in Havana  
who could print his logo on sturdy 
paper bags.
“That guy, he made the idea for 
me,” says Valladares, who had one  
of those capitalist epiphanies you  
see a lot more of in communist  
Cuba today.
A year before, President Raúl 
Castro had expanded the range of 
private businesses Cubans could 
start. So Valladares and his wife, 
Maida, launched Adorgraf making 
personalized bags – with handles, a 
deluxe feature in Cuba. (He makes 
sure I see the winding yarn grips on 
his Obama bags.)
The demand overwhelmed them – 
and so did the money that poured in.
As in, 20% annual revenue 
growth. Valladares recently bought 
his family’s first car—a shiny pink 
Russian-made Lada 1600. He has  
almost 30 employees, most of  
whom earn three or more times  
the $20-a-month most Cuban 
workers make. They also get benefits 
such as family leave.
Adorgraf still has just a modest 
workshop that sits on an unpaved 
street near Havana’s airport. To 
understand why the company is a 
player, check out the wall inside, 
where Valladares displays bags with 
his clients’ logos.
“For example,” he says, “Caracol, 
Gaviota, BDC International, Café 
Escorial…”
Most of them are large, state-run 
firms. And that matters a lot to 
Cuba’s fledgling private sector.
Cuba today is home to half a 
million private business owners,  
or cuentapropistas. Not long ago  
they were considered folks making 
a few extra pesos in the island’s 
threadbare economy.
But today they account for almost  
a quarter of Cuba's economy and  
employ almost a third of its workforce.  
And the fact that the state is now  
a cuentapropista customer means  
that private ventures have assumed  
a much more essential role.
“It’s an important psychological 
step,” says Augusto Maxwell, a 
Cuba’s Communist State Is 
Now a Client of Its Capitalist 
Entrepreneurs
by Tim Padgett
Future Cuban entrepreneur Mairene Valladares (right) 
with a Welcome, Obama t-shirt that she and her 
business-owner parents, Rubén (center) and Maida, 
printed. (TOM HUDSON/WLRN)
Rubén Valladares points to one of the printed bags he has made in his Havana workshop. His private 
company sells the bags to many Cuban state-owned companies. (TOM HUDSON/WLRN)
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Cuban-American attorney who heads 
the Cuba practice at the Akerman 
law firm in Miami.
Maxwell was in Cuba in March 
during Obama’s visit, and he says 
a big question now is whether the 
entrepreneurs’ new clout might lead 
to more free-market reforms.
“That’s a conversation between 
the Cuban entrepreneurs and their 
government,” he notes.
And it’s not any easy one.
“Oh, it is very complicated for 
us,” Valladares tells me with a more 
exasperated chuckle.
So complicated that he has to  
stop speaking English and explain  
it in Spanish.
For example, he points out: The 
Cuban government still won’t let 
private businesses buy materials 
directly from the wholesale market. 
It’s a power thing. So when 
Valladares needs paper from the 
state-run wholesaler to fill orders  
for bags, his clients have to buy  
the paper first. Then he buys it  
from them.
It doesn’t make sense in Spanish, either.
Which brings us to why Valladares 
printed up all those bags welcoming 
Obama, who is arguably the biggest 
champion of Cuban cuentapropistas.
“Social responsibility is very 
important,” he says, “but I think it’s 
very important that we the private 
sector push to change this situation. 
Maybe Obama can help to change 
this problem.”
In fact, Obama just took another 
step toward that end. Only Congress 
can lift the trade embargo against 
Cuba. But last March the US issued 
new rules that let private Cuban 
firms buy and sell with America  
and access credit there.
Maxwell says that puts the ball once 
again in the Castro government’s court.
“We’ve created the infrastructure 
that would allow them to plug into 
our side,” he says. “Now it’s up to  
the Cubans to figure out to what 
extent the Cuban entrepreneurs  
can plug in.”
Entrepreneurs like Valladares really 
aren’t waiting to find out.
And neither is South Florida.
That’s where Valladares hooked 
up last year with a Hialeah printing 
company, Florida Flex.
“We are importing from Hialeah,” 
he says with a sly grin.
For months now Valladares has 
been engaged with Florida Flex in 
what cuentapropistas call Samsonite 
importing: Bringing raw goods—in 
this case, silkscreen printing ink 
and equipment—from Hialeah to 
Havana in bulging suitcases  
and boxes.
Florida Flex, which is owned by 
Cuban Americans, is also poised to 
bring some of Adorgraf ’s employees 
to Hialeah to train them in more 
advanced skills.
It’s that kind of enterprising spirit 
that keeps Adorgraf ’s workshop 
humming. And it earned Valladares 
an invitation to Obama’s event with 
Cuban entrepreneurs in Havana, 
where the President gave them a  
pep talk.
“Cuba’s economic future,”  
Obama told the entrepreneurs 
assembled, “depends on growth  
in the private sector.”
That seems as plain as a paper bag. 
Tim Padgett is America’s Editor at 
WLRN News. He has covered Latin 
America for nearly 25 years and 
received Columbia University’s Maria 
Moors Cabot Prize for his body of  
work on the region.
Cuban entrepreneur Caridad Limonta (left) who owns a clothing firm called Procle 
in Havana. Her son Oskar (right) will attend a business training course at Florida 
International University this summer. (TIM PADGETT/WLRN)
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W hen I first started traveling to Cuba in the early 1990s, the few tourist 
stores had dark curtains in their 
windows. They allowed only a 
few people inside at a time, part 
of a concerted effort to hide their 
goods, suppress the desire for 
the vast world of material things 
unattainable to the majority, curtail 
envy, and control the viral spread of 
resentment. This tension is echoed 
in the 1985 Cuban film Lejanía 
(Parting of the Ways), by Jesús Díaz, 
which portrays an exiled mother in 
Miami who returns to Cuba after 
a decade away. She arrives loaded 
with suitcases full of clothes and 
electronics for the son she left when 
he was a teenager, but he refuses 
to accept the gifts, finding her 
consumerism repugnant. 
I left Cuba as a child with 
my parents and returned as an 
anthropologist. I was in a strange 
role, able to move between the 
comforts of the emerging tourist 
industry and the decaying socialist 
sector that could no longer meet 
people’s most basic needs. The 
years following the fall of the Soviet 
Union were a time of hunger and 
scarcity, and I wanted to slip money 
into the pockets of everyone I met. 
But most Cubans back then still 
believed in volunteerism, working 
for the good of the people and the 
ideal of giving without putting 
a monetary value on human 
relationships. So I held back, not 
sure whether to offer charity, fearing 
I’d be taken for an obnoxious 
returning Cuban flaunting  
my privilege.
That era has ended for sure.
I traveled to Cuba several times 
in 2015 to take the pulse of the 
island in the aftermath of restored 
diplomatic relations with the United 
States. Havana’s José Martí Airport 
is now barely able to handle the 
numbers of US travelers passing 
through, taking hours to transport 
luggage to the carousels. Hotels 
are packed, upscale restaurants 
require reservations, and hipster 
spots such as Café Madrigal, with 
its exposed brick walls and edgy 
art, are bustling. Vendors peddle 
tourist tchotchkes on every corner 
and street musicians sing the 
“Chan Chan” song for a tip. Local 
entrepreneurs sell services from 
hairstyling to tutoring (the public 
education system isn’t what it used 
to be) to other Cubans. Stores are 
stocked with everything from Nikes 
and knockoff Dolce and Gabbana 
T-shirts to toilet seats (in scarce 
supply until now). Elders on the 
street hawk a tube of Colgate or 
a razor in its package. Those still 
working at government jobs that 
provide a free lunch will try to sell 
their sandwich and soda for a profit. 
This year, everything I’ve seen 
and done in Cuba has become 
part of a complex reckoning, a 
need to respond to the question 
everyone is seeking to answer: 
What has changed in Cuba? But 
a more personal question has also 
haunted me: Who do I want to be 
in the new Cuba? A few experiences 
have left me uneasy about my own 
participation in the Cuba that  
is emerging. 
One took place in a new gelato 
place in the gentrifying Habana 
Vieja zone, a crossroads of tourist 
sites, galleries, boutiques, restaurants 
and local residents with no running 
water in their apartments. Helad’oro 
is a private business that only accepts 
the Cuban convertible currency 
(CUC), pegged at 13% above the 
US dollar. (Government salaries are 
in the Cuban peso, and most people 
earn the equivalent of $20–$30 a 
month.) It offers gelato in flavors 
such as mojito and pineapple. Prices 
are less than you’d pay in Europe 
or the US but expensive for the 
average Cuban. On the day I was 
there, a Cuban artist-friend and I 
chose simple one-scoop cones and 
sat down on the slippery new orange 
plastic chairs. As we dug into our 
gelato, we saw two boys, aged 10 or 
11, their faces pressed against the 
shiny glass windows, staring at us. 
They were Afro-Cuban and clearly 
from the neighborhood. A blond, 
German-speaking tourist family, 
with two children the same age as 
C O M M E N T A R I E S
Gelato and a Balmy Evening Ride in an American Convertible:
To Be or Not to Be  
in the New Cuba
by Ruth Behar
the boys outside, also sat down for 
gelatos. When they saw the boys 
staring, they invited them inside and 
offered to buy them a treat.  
A male employee scolded the boys 
for bothering the customers and 
ordered them to leave. Apparently, it 
was not the first time the boys had 
begged for ice cream. The couple 
purchased the gelato anyway and 
brought it to the boys outside and 
they stood eating it there until the 
employee drove them off.
Ice cream is a political subject 
in Cuba. The state-run Coppelia, 
where the superb Tomás Gutiérrez 
Alea film, Strawberry and Chocolate,  
begins and ends, is a socialist ice 
cream cathedral created soon after 
the Revolution in 1966. An outdoor 
pavilion surrounded by banyan 
trees, it has the capacity to serve up 
to 35,000 people a day. Coppelia 
was a utopian effort to bring ice 
cream to the people. If you’re 
willing to wait on a long line, you 
can still get affordable ice cream in 
Cuban pesos, or an expedited line 
caters to those who pay 25 times 
more in CUC. In the early 1990s, 
when milk was scarce and one meal 
a day was all that most Cubans 
could hope for, people would line 
up at dawn at Coppelia to buy ice 
cream for breakfast. A wide range 
of flavors was offered in the early 
days, when the Russians subsidized 
the economy, but the moment 
the Special Period hit Coppelia 
was reduced to offering only one 
“feminine” and one “masculine” 
flavor, strawberry and chocolate 
(thus the title of the movie). Flavors 
to this day remain limited and 
the quality of the ice cream has 
deteriorated. Not surprisingly, a 
reviewer on Trip Advisor raved 
about Helad’oro and its “all natural 
ice cream,” exclaiming, “Forget the 
very low-standard Copellia” (sic).
Although the gelato was indeed 
delicious, I felt sad consuming it 
while the neighborhood kids were 
being mistreated. It felt to me 
like a portent of the times ahead 
and the daily injuries of class 
division and humiliation that are 
spreading in Cuba, even as exciting 
opportunities arise for those in a 
position to benefit from them. I 
am a child of exiles and can’t ever 
forget that, but I guess a part of 
me has always wanted to believe 
in the ideals of equality and justice 
symbolized by the Revolution. It 
has been heartbreaking to observe 
the disintegration of those ideals in 
everyday life. How is it that Cuban 
doctors have managed to reduce 
infant mortality below US rates, 
yet little boys in Havana still beg 
for gelato? That wasn’t supposed to 
happen in Cuba.
 I had another uneasy experience 
at the end of a week I spent with a 
group of scholars and artists who 
enjoyed seeing all the signs of the 
cultural and artistic rebirth in Cuba. 
On our last night in Havana, we 
took a breezy ride in six classic 
American cars, impeccably restored 
convertibles painted in colors from 
serene blue to flamingo pink. The 
vintage cars seemed to have been 
waiting all those years in Cuba just 
so Americans would come back one 
day and take a spin in them. 
It was a perfect balmy evening for 
a ride, but the thrill of being driven 
around ocean-misted Havana like 
a 1950s movie star died when we 
passed a crowded bus station and I 
saw fellow Cubans waiting to catch 
a bus home for the equivalent of a 
penny. They looked weary. I turned 
away, afraid to catch their glance.
Moments before sunset, the 
fleet of gaily painted automobiles, 
sounding their singsong horns, 
stopped at the Plaza of the Revolution 
in time for us to see the outlined 
images of revolutionary heroes Che 
Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos 
burst into bright lights. It was a 
beautiful sight, definitely worthy of 
a picture. Everyone was snapping 
photos. Soon I couldn’t help myself; 
I did, too. Dutiful child that I am, I 
thought of my parents: Would they 
be upset? I wasn’t sure anymore to 
which Cuba I belonged—the Cuba 
of the people waiting for the bus; 
the Cuba of exiles like my parents, 
who’d left and didn’t want to return; 
or the Cuba of people like me, 
coming back with our privileges  
and our nostalgia to see how the 
island is changing. 
Cuba’s independence leader,  
José Martí, who spent years as an 
exile in New York, once wrote that 
he had two countries, “Cuba and 
the night.” As we left the plaza  
and drove on to dinner at one  
of Havana’s most exquisite 
restaurants, I found myself saying  
a prayer under my breath: May 
Cuba find its way through the  
long dark night that lies ahead. 
 
Ruth Behar is the Victor Haim Perera 
Collegiate Professor of Anthropology at 
the University of Michigan.
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Cuban Nationalism and the 
Future of US-Cuba Relations
by Michael Parmly
C uba’s… geographic realities give it physical unity; the absence of formal impediments to the 
spontaneous relations among its 
inhabitants produces demographic 
unity; the uniformed forces give it 
police unity. From ‘colonial times,’ 
Cuba possesses unity in its traditions, 
and the essentially common destiny 
experienced by its various regions 
affirms its historical unity. The 
combination of those elements has 
been sufficiently intense to give a 
certain psychological nature to the 
population that one can speak of  
‘a Cuban character.’ 
This description, part of Antonio 
Guiteras’s political platform for the 
political organization “Joven Cuba” 
in 1934 (quoted in Antonio Guiteras: 
Su pensamiento revolucionario, 
Havana, 1974, p. 183), is a useful  
summation of a concrete reality.  
Even today, Guiteras’s pronouncement 
remains an accurate profile of the 
island nation of some 11.2 million 
people. Just last year, Cuban Foreign 
Minister Bruno Rodríguez echoed 
these sentiments at the flag-raising 
ceremony at Cuba’s Embassy in 
Washington, D.C., crediting “the  
free and unshakable will, unity, 
sacrifice, selflessness, heroic 
resistance and work of our people, 
and also the strength of the Cuban 
Nation and its culture,” for making 
possible that historic occasion.
The qualities lauded in both 
statements are part of a rich cultural 
tradition that can be traced back 
at least as far as Félix Varela in the 
Satirical cartoon in ‘The Verdict’ against Theodore Roosevelt and the Platt Amendment, 1899.  
Library of Congress. (12/UIG/AFP/Getty Images)
early nineteenth century, through 
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes several 
decades later and José Martí at the 
turn of the twentieth century, and 
on to the present day. Something 
had to account for Cuba’s ability to 
maintain a separate identity during 
the half-century when the US 
dominated its economy and society, 
and then the five decades of deep 
hostility between the island and its 
northern neighbor. The factor that 
preserved Cuba’s independence, as 
much as anything else, was  
Cuban nationalism.
Admittedly, the term “nationalism” 
can be controversial, evoking such 
concepts as National Socialism 
and xenophobia. To the extent 
that nationalism is a belief in an 
aggressive superiority complex, 
or worse, racial antagonism 
towards a country’s neighbors, that 
opprobrium is justified. But a sense 
of nationalism that contributes 
to national unity, without an 
antagonistic foreign antithesis, and 
that helps energize a population 
in pursuit of positive, constructive 
objectives—an increase in well-
being for the majority, or progress 
towards legitimate foreign policy 
objectives—represents a positive 
factor in international affairs. In 
its most strident form, nationalism 
can be used as a sort of rallying cry 
“to man the barricades.” In its more 
benign form, however, it can be 
a tool for governments to explain 
the need for short-term sacrifice to 
produce long-term benefits for the 
population as a whole. The latter 
description characterizes the type  
of nationalism most commonly  
seen in Cuba.
The components of nationalism 
are multiple and vary with each 
case (and for that matter, with 
each historical era). History and 
geography, demography and 
economics, and culture in the 
broadest sense—all are important 
elements in explaining why a 
population responds to and believes 
in nationalistic stimulation. Most 
important, nationalistic peoples 
believe deeply in themselves. 
Why was—and is—nationalism 
important to Cuba? 
Whenever a population lives in 
the shadow of a larger neighbor, 
that population seeks to ensure the 
autonomy of its own identity. Since 
at least the middle of the nineteenth 
century, Cuba has been concerned 
with preserving its independence. 
A desire to dominate Cuba, even if 
not the stated policy of successive 
US administrations, was a fairly 
constant theme of prominent 
American politicians, from then-
Secretary of State John Quincy 
Adams and his 1823 comparison of 
Cuba to “ripe fruit” ready to fall into 
the lap of the United States, through 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who 
wrote in 1895 that “the island of 
Cuba… will become a necessity.” 
In the first half of the nineteenth 
century, slaveholding interests in 
the United States saw the sizeable 
slave population of Cuba as a logical 
reason for coveting the island as a 
further expansion of slave territory. 
When most of the rest of Spain’s 
holdings in the Western Hemisphere 
won their independence in the early 
nineteenth century, prominent 
Americans—including many in 
government—saw the moment 
as propitious to try to buy Cuba 
from Spain. The US insistence on 
including the Platt Amendment in 
the body of the Cuban Constitution 
as a condition for withdrawal of 
American troops at the turn of the 
twentieth century served as further 
confirmation for many Cubans of 
the US desire to control the island’s 
political destiny. Cubans had 
good reason to worry about their 
independence, and Fidel Castro’s 
desire to break ties with the US  
was a logical continuation of  
that sentiment.
Cubans’ belief in a separate 
identity continues to the present 
time. Relations with Venezuela 
became intimate at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, but Cuban 
officials recoiled at the suggestion 
that Havana “depended” on 
Caracas. Cubans remain reluctant to 
affirm that the evolution of Cuban 
socialism should follow a Chinese 
or a Vietnamese model. Above all, 
most do not want to see a return of 
the 1930s, ’40s and ’50s, when the 
US dominated Cuban economic 
and social life.
Raúl Castro would be well 
advised to use Cuban nationalism 
as a rallying cry to mobilize the 
Cuban population to engage in the 
major rebuilding that the island 
so desperately needs. In Barack 
Obama, he has an interlocutor  
ready to respect Cuban identity. 
Michael Parmly is a retired US 
Foreign Service Officer who served as 
Chief of Mission at the US Interests 
Section in Havana, Cuba from 2005 
to 2008.
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The decades of  mutual hostility that characterized the Cold War between the United States 
and Cuba thawed significantly 
on December 17, 2014, with the 
dramatic announcement that the 
two countries would reestablish 
diplomatic relations. The surprise 
announcement, which followed 
18 months of secret negotiations 
between the two countries, was 
designed to create a new political 
reality for Cuba policy for future 
administrations to follow. To  
achieve the diplomatic breakthrough, 
Obama’s Cuba policy team not only 
abandoned incrementalism but also 
dropped many of the demands of 
past US administrations regarding 
human rights and democratization, 
demands the Castros have repeatedly 
rejected. By fundamentally  
changing the relationship Obama 
hopes to permanently improve  
US-Cuba relations.
The president’s inability to get 
Republican support for his Cuba 
policy, however, may endanger its 
long-term viability. US relations 
with Cuba became an early issue  
in the 2016 presidential election. 
While the presumptive Democratic 
nominee, Hillary Clinton, favored  
the new policy, two of the Republican  
frontrunners adamantly opposed 
normalization. Cuban-American 
senators Marco Rubio and Ted 
Cruz, both strong early contenders 
for their party’s nomination, pledged 
to downgrade the US embassy in 
Havana to a diplomatic interest 
section and restore tougher limits 
on US government and business 
dealings with the island.
Senator Cruz told Fox News host 
Neil Cavuto that the rapprochement 
with Cuba “will be remembered as 
a tragic mistake.” He criticized the 
decision as part of the larger failure 
of US policy under Obama: “The 
president believes appeasement 
works. When it comes to dealing 
with tyrants and bullies, whether it 
is Russian President Vladimir Putin, 
whether it is Iran, or whether it is the 
Castros in Cuba, he believes that a  
position of weakness is how we should 
negotiate, and that doesn’t work.” 
While Senator Cruz has been 
outspoken in his criticism of the  
president’s policy, Senator Rubio  
consistently raised it as a campaign  
issue. Cuba is an integral part of 
Rubio’s world view and a hardline 
foreign policy committed to the  
restoration of US power and 
influence. From his seat on the  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,  
Rubio has been a powerful critic 
of the president’s foreign policy, 
opposing negotiations with Iran over 
its nuclear program, pressing for 
more support for the Syrian rebels, 
and calling for increased military 
assistance to Ukraine to counter 
Russia’s influence. 
Rubio clearly outlined his foreign 
policy views and his objections 
to the new Cuba policy when he 
addressed the Council on Foreign 
Relations on May 13, 2015. 
Arguing that the new policy towards 
Cuba would only strengthen the 
island’s communist dictatorship, 
he pledged as president to roll back 
Obama’s concessions. Rubio said:
First, on day one, I will give the 
Castros a choice: either continue 
repressing your people and lose the 
diplomatic relations and benefits 
provided by President Obama, or 
carry out meaningful political and 
human rights reforms and receive 
increased US trade, investment, and 
support. Second, I will restore Cuba 
to the state sponsor of terror list until  
it stops supporting designated Foreign  
Terrorist Organizations, helping 
North Korea evade international 
sanctions, or harboring fugitives 
from American justice. Third, I  
will do everything in my power  
to provide support to Cuba’s pro-
democracy movement, promote 
greater access to uncensored 
information for the Cuban people, 
and deprive the Castro regime  
of the funding for its repressive 
security state.
Clearly, with Rubio in the White 
House rapprochement with Cuba 
would end.
Obama opted for a dramatic 
and surprising rapprochement 
because, given the sensitivity of 
Cuba policy, his team believed 
that any incremental approach was 
doomed to failure. Although he 
could not lift the embargo without 
congressional approval, he used 
his substantial executive powers to 
undermine it. Executive action was 
the fastest and only route for the 
president to commence immediate 
Cuba and the 2016  
Presidential Elections
by Dario Moreno and Maria Ilcheva
policy changes, and with Congress 
unlikely to take action he seems to 
be seeking additional opportunities 
to act unilaterally. At the daily press 
briefing on November 4, 2015, State 
Department spokesman John Kirby 
confirmed that President Obama 
was reviewing various “options” to 
ease the trade and financial embargo 
on Cuba through executive action. 
Obama also made a historic visit to 
Cuba in March 2016, the first by a 
sitting US president in 88 years.
The Obama administration 
recognized that a slow, measured 
approach is likely to be overtaken by 
events. Kissinger’s effort to establish 
a dialogue with Cuba was disrupted 
by the Angolan crisis in 1974–1975, 
and Clinton’s “calibrated approach” 
was interrupted by the Brothers to 
the Rescue shoot down in 1996. 
Incremental approaches also tend to 
fail because they do not change the 
fundamental relationship and are 
easily reversible. In 1975, Ford lifted 
the embargo on trade with Cuba by 
subsidiaries of US corporations in 
third countries; in 1992, the  
Cuban Democracy Act re-imposed 
them. In 1977, Carter lifted the 
travel ban to Cuba; in 1982,  
Reagan restored it. President Obama 
hopes that fundamentally altering 
US-Cuba relations will make  
change irreversible.
As it turned out, however, Obama 
underestimated the commitments 
of the two Republican Cuban-
American senators to maintain the 
hardline policy toward their parents’ 
homeland, as well as their political 
skill in making the president’s 
foreign policy easy political fodder 
in the 2016 campaign. In response 
to the announcement of the 
thawing of US-Cuba relations, 
Senator Rubio called Obama “the 
worst negotiator that we’ve had as a 
president since at least Jimmy Carter 
and maybe in the modern history of 
this country.” Senator Cruz called 
the policy “disastrous” and accused 
the administration of being “blind 
to the fact that they are being played 
by brutal dictators whose only goal 
is maintaining power.”
The dynamics of the 2016 
presidential race shifted attention 
from Cuba to other issues of 
importance to voters. In March 
2016, Senator Rubio withdrew 
from the race after losing the 
Republican primary in his home 
state, Florida, to Donald Trump. 
As of April 2016, Ted Cruz is the 
only remaining candidate who 
maintains a hardline approach 
towards Cuba. If elected, he has 
promised to use executive action 
to reverse Obama’s concessions to 
Cuba, as other presidents have done 
in the past, but the unexpected rise 
of Donald Trump as the Republican 
frontrunner and the increasing 
likelihood that he will be his party’s 
nominee make any course correction 
on Cuba unlikely. In September 
2015, Trump asserted that “the 
concept of opening with Cuba is 
fine… but we should have made a 
better deal.” Trump has not revealed 
specifics of this “better deal” and 
has largely treated Cuba with 
nonchalance during this election 
cycle. In a 1999 Miami Herald 
interview, however, he asserted:
Yes, the embargo is costly. If I 
formed a joint venture with 
European partners, I would make 
millions of dollars. But I’d rather 
lose those millions than lose my 
self-respect. I would rather take 
a financial hit than become a 
financial backer of one of the world’s 
most brutal dictators, a man who 
was once willing to aid in the 
destruction of my country. To me  
the embargo question is no question 
at all. Of course, we should keep the 
embargo in place. We should keep it 
until Castro is gone.
Given Trump’s vicissitudes of 
opinions and rhetoric, the course he 
would take on Cuba, if elected, is 
anyone’s guess.
Dario Moreno is Associate Professor  
of Politics and International Relations 
at Florida International University, 
and Maria Ilcheva is a Research 
Associate at the Laboratory for Social 
Science Research in the University’s 
Metropolitan Center.
A couple watches TV coverage of a US presidential election in Havana. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)
38 Hemisphere Volume 25 Hemisphere Volume 25 39
CommentariesCommentaries
After more than  half a century of productive relations with Cuba, Canada can expect the 
Obama Administration’s decision 
to normalize US-Cuban relations 
to have an adverse effect on its 
interests. From both the Canadian 
and Cuban perspectives, Ottawa’s 
formal diplomatic connection with 
Havana has been important. Canada 
and Britain were the only powers 
to recognize Fidel Castro’s regime 
from the moment it took power in 
1959. Despite periodic difficulties—
the 1962 missile crisis, the Castro 
government’s Angolan intervention 
in the 1970s, and the periodic 
distaste of both Canadian Liberal 
and Conservative governments in 
the 1990s and 2000s for Havana’s 
domestic human rights record—
Cuban-Canadian relations have 
remained positive over the years.
Canadian anti-Americanism is 
always just below the surface and is 
one element of Canada’s desire to 
pursue a sovereign foreign policy, 
despite pressure from Washington 
to support the Cold War embargo 
and, after the Soviet Union’s collapse 
in the early 1990s, the intense 
economic warfare engendered by 
the Torricelli and Helms-Burton 
acts. Ottawa has opted instead 
for a policy of “constructive 
engagement” toward Cuba, based 
on three pillars: 1) investments by 
Canadian corporations, chiefly hotel 
companies and resource extraction 
firms such as Sherritt International. 
(Under the terms of the Helms-
Burton act, Sherritt’s corporate 
officers face criminal charges should 
they travel to the United States); 
2) trade (as of 2009, CAD$317.9 
million in Canadian exports and 
CAD$500.4 million in Cuban 
imports); and 3) people-to-people 
contacts. By 2013, one million 
winter-weary Canadian tourists 
had flocked to Cuban beaches and 
cities and learned first hand about 
everyday Cuban life. Conversely, 
especially after the onset of Cuba’s 
“Special Period” of economic 
hardship beginning in the early 
1990s, about 15,000 Cubans who 
left the island settled in Canada, 
precisely because it was not Miami. 
Cuban émigrés to Canada often 
perceive it as less racist—even if this 
is not necessarily true—and more 
liberal in its domestic social and 
economic policies than the United 
States. Normalized US-Cuban 
relations will probably not have 
much of an effect on the emigration 
pattern of Cubans wishing to leave 
the island for a new life in places 
other than the United States, and 
Canadian tourists will continue 
going south. And Canada might still 
have some residual political strength; 
even the strongly anti-communist 
Conservative government then in 
office in Canada (under Stephen 
Harper, 2006–2015) played a role 
in facilitating the negotiations that 
led to Obama’s announcement of 
normalized relations.
In the short term, D17 will not 
significantly affect existing Canadian 
investment, trade and transnational 
links. If anything, improved US-
Cuban relations, a weaker embargo, 
and market opening in Cuba would 
likely benefit Canadian interests. 
In the long term, however, as the 
embargo disappears, Canadian trade 
and investment will be dwarfed 
by the much larger and powerful 
United States as its agribusiness, 
consumer industries and, perhaps, 
banking and financial institutions 
seek to recover ground lost since 
1959. Politically, under the Liberal 
government that took office in 
October 2015, Canadian-Cuban 
relations should remain on an  
even keel.
For Ottawa, the main challenge 
posed by normalizing US-Cuban 
relations is the residual influence of 
US cultural capital on the island. 
Some Canadian universities with 
long-established agreements with 
the University of Havana have 
already noticed a Cuban preference 
for expanded agreements with US 
institutions. In other endeavors, 
such as medical research, Cuban 
advances will find a larger and 
wealthier market that goes beyond 
Canada and the other countries 
that have enjoyed a monopoly on 
Canada’s Island in the Sun? 
The Impact of D17
by Catherine Krull
Cuba’s interest under the embargo. 
Canada will find it difficult to 
compete after full normalization as 
easier access by Cubans to American 
music, cinema, television and other 
cultural commodities—and the 
reverse, which will certainly include 
increased US imports of Cuban 
cigars, rum and music, plus the 
appeal of sun-drenched beaches for 
US tourists—cements US-Cuban 
transnational ties. With memories 
of its pre-1959 status as an exotic 
tropical locale, Americans will 
perceive Cuba as a desirable place 
to invest, trade, visit and establish 
exchanges of all types. 
Cuban President Raúl Castro is 
scheduled to retire in 2018, and 
whoever leads the government 
after that will need to devote more 
attention to the United States than 
to any other country. Canadian-
Cuban people-to-people contact 
will continue and, perhaps, expand, 
but Cuba will no longer be Canada’s 
exclusive island in the sun. 
Catherine Krull is Dean of the Faculty 
of Social Sciences and Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Victoria 
in Canada.
Mario Sanabria pushes his bicycle loaded with tourist trinkets through the surf of the Atlantic Ocean. Sanabria lives in Matanzas (a nearby city) 
and hustles the Canadian visitors that flock to the resort area of Varadero. (CYRUS MCCRIMMON/THE DENVER POST/Getty Images)
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Cuba after D17
by Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo
P H O T O  E S S A Y
Goodbye, CCCP. A quarter of a century after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, its iconography continues to appear on Cuban streets. (Obispo 
Boulevard, Old Havana)
The end of history. Slogans and car bodies converge in a parking lot 
near post-revolutionary ruins. (Reina Street, Central Havana)
Socialism, sovereignty, independence. The dictionary of despotism in neo-Castrist Cuba conserves its candid calligraphy. (Miramar, Havana)
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Yankees, come home? In 2006, the Cuban government erected 140 flagpoles to obstruct critical 
messages running on an electronic ticker at the US Interests Section. A decade later, neither the black 
flags nor the ticker remains, and the US Interests Section is now the newly inaugurated US Embassy.  
(Vedado, Havana)
Like a parody of the canonical cha-cha-chá made famous by the Aragón Orchestra: “The Americans have arrived, 
and they come dancing with cash-cash-cash…” (Central Havana)
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McCastro self-employment. New Cuban entrepreneurs are more than willing to spur the battered national 
economy...if they can survive the totalitarian obstacles along the way. (Miramar, Havana)
The art of waiting along Havana’s seafront has transformed into anxiety about landing. Granma yachts are 
now cargo and cruise ships. (Central Havana)
A cobbler revolution. When a display of patriotic fervor is required, it’s almost impossible to find a 
cheap flag that’s not sold in convertible currency. (Central Havana)
Fashion’s own Bay of Pigs. After decades of censorship, US logos and flags have peacefully invaded 
Cuban landscapes. (Central Havana)
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From brainwashing to image-washing. The Cuban auto-transition from power to power may change its variables, but the equation will remain the 
same. (Lawton, Havana)
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